COMMENT
CORPORATE PRIVACY: A REMEDY FOR THE
VICTIM OF INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE
INTRODUCTION

Although the topic of industrial espionage' has evoked a

considerable discussion over the last several years, 2 it has been an
infrequent subject of litigation. 3 For the most part the discussion of
industrial espionage has concerned its effects and ramifications upon
American industry, with generally little attention to the legal means
by which its victims may seek relief. The means of seeking relief,

however, have recently become a more popular subject of inquiry 4 and
has generated an impressive number of analyses and proposals.-

Proceeding upon the assumption that corporations should in fact be
protected from the ravages of industrial espionage, this comment will
analyze the present legal posture of the industrial espionage victim
and suggest one means by which protection might be afforded. To put
this discussion in perspective, the evolution of the several trends which
I. "Industrial espionage is the practice of engaging in surreptitious surveillance for the
purpose of discovering a businessman's secrets." Comment, Industrial Espionage: Piracy of
Secret Scientific and Technical Information, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 911 (1967) [hereinafter cited
as Industrial Espionage]. To be distinguished from industrial espionage are the normal
intelligence activities lawfully practiced by most competitors. See generally Smith, Business
Espionage, FORTUNE, May, 1956, at 118-20.
2. Considerable commentary exists on the ramifications and effects of industrial espionage

on American industry. For a bibliography see 2 R. CALLMANN, UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS, & MONOPOLIES § 56 (3d ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as CALLMANN]; R. MILGRIM,
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, TRADE SECRETS § 5.05 (1967) [hereinafter cited as MILGRIM];
Industrial Espionage 911 n.2; Comment, Industrial Secrets and the Skilled Employee, 38
N.Y.U.L. REV. 324, 326 (1963) [hereinafter cited as IndustrialSecrets]. Such commentary has
served the function of surveying the magnitude of the problem and analyzing the motivation that
induces competitors to indulge in espionage activities. See Hearings on S. 928 Before the
Subconim. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. of the Judiciary,
90th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 2, at 551 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Hearingson S. 928].
Although prominent articles have appeared which discount the industrial espionage threat,
see, e.g., Furasch, Industrial Espionage,HARV. Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec., 1959, at 6, the sheer mass
of material on the subject attests to its prominence in the business community.
3. Klein, The Technical Trade Secret Quadrangle:A Survey, 55 Nw. U.L. REV. 437, 462
(1962) [hereinafter cited as Klein].
4. See Hearings on S. 928, at 610 (Report of the Invasion of Privacy Study Committee of
the State of Georgia); Industrial Espionage915-25. See notes 105-06 infra and accompanying
text.
5. See notes 105-06 infra and accompanying text.

DUKE LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 1971:391

have created a situation which demands a new remedy must be
reviewed.
The Privilege of CompetitorSurveillance
Since participation in a competitive economic system requires

knowledge and information concerning the nature of competitor
activity, the privilege of competition has always been thought to
include the right to survey competitors for general market
intelligence -for example, product characteristics, marketing plans,
pricing policies, and manufacturing methods.6 Such a right, however,

is subject to abuse, 7 and the courts early assumed the task of
monitoring its exercise. In fulfilling that duty, the courts sought to

prevent abuses by prohibiting the use of those means of surveillance
which would allow the acquisition of information not reasonably
8
necessary for the promotion of competition.

To serve this role as market referee, the courts were required to

impose on competitors the constraints and incentives necessary for the
facilitation of that mode of market conduct deemed beneficial by
society-traditionally encouraging innovation and discouraging

wrongful conduct.' These goals were not contradictory since
6. "A competitor can and must shop his competitors for pricing and examine his products
for quality, components, and methods of manufacture." E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v.
Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971). Were it
otherwise, the first person to make a discovery would have a monopoly. See RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS § 757, comment a at 2 (1939).
The subject matter of industrial espionage covers different types of tangible and intangible,
technical and non-technical information, and includes commercial secrets as well as operational
information. The term commercial secrets refers to data which is subject to trade secret
protection. See note 70 infra and accompanying text. Operational information, however, refers
to data not subject to traditional trade secret protection although of equal value to businessmen
and held in comparable secrecy. This distinction in the treatment of commercial secrets and
operational information is an important reason for expanding the basis of relief available to the
industrial espionage victim. See notes 136-37 infra and accompanying text. These two classes of
information are discussed in detail in Note, Trade Secret Protection of Non-Technical
Competitive Information, 54 IOWA L. REV. 1164-67 (1969).
7. See I CALLMANN § 1.
8. See Peterson, The Legislative Mandate of Sears and Compco: A Plea for a FederalLaw
of Unfair Competition, 69 DicK. L. REv. 347, 348 (1965).
9. The discouragement of reprehensible business practices and the encouragement of
innovational activity are said to insure economic growth. Water Servs., Inc. v. Tesco Chems.,
Inc., 410 F.2d 163, 172 (5th Cir. 1969). See also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, comment a
(1939); Bender, Trade Secret Protection of Software, 38 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 909, 910, 924
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Bender]; Stedman, Trade Secrets, 23 OHIo ST. L.J. 4, 31 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as Stedman); Note, Industrial Espionage-Nebraska'sNew Felony, 45 NEn.
L. REV. 644 (1966).
These are the same bases of the patent, copyright, and trademark laws. Sears, Roebuck &
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innovation was encouraged by affording the discoverer of a new idea a
protected status by precluding his competitors from wrongfully
discovering or using the idea.10 To implement those broad policy
dictates, the common law evolved a series of rather amorphous trade
secret and unfair competition doctrines which sought to protect the
discoverer of commercial secrets, while at the same time allowing
competitors enough latitude to exercise their traditional, and
necessary, privilege of competitor surveillance." The essence of these
doctrines was that the owner of a secret was protected against
improper means of discovery, while the competitor 2 retained the right
to make use of proper means to discover the secret.1
Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964). The Constitution provides that: "The Congress
U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 8.
shall have Power. . .To promote the Progress of Science.
10. A protected status encourages innovation since during the secrecy of the discovery the
discoverer has monopolistic power over its application and may exploit that position to recoup
research costs and seek profits, hopefully before competition duplicates or reverse engineers the
product. Water Servs., Inc. v. Tesco Chems., Inc., 410 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1969). See also ABA
SECTION OF PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT LAW PROCEEDINGS 174 (1969); Bender 924;
Stedman 25.
Innovation is also said to be fostered by a policy favoring the dissemination of ideas, since
disclosure promotes competition and makes possible an informed market where knowledge is
applied to accelerate technological development. Stedman 31; IndustrialEspionage 913-14. If
dissemination is the goal, however, a protected status would still be preferable, since protection
stimulates commercial exploitation through licensing. See Bender 924; 84 HARV. L. REV. 477,
482 (1970). All of these arguments are discussed in Note, Doctrine of Licensee Estoppel
Overruled; State Protection of Unpatented Inventions Questioned--Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 45
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 386, 392-93 (1970).
If protection is not provided, innovation will be discouraged by the competitive
disadvantages of innovators who have not only lost their monopoly gestation period in which to
recover costs and seek profits, but whose competitors have obtained the fruits of their research
without corresponding development costs. See Bartenstein, Research Espionage: A Threat to
Our NationalSecurity, 17 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 813, 820 (1962); Bender 910; Daniel, Spies
Invade Big Business, READER'S DIGEST, Jan., 1962, at 93, 97. See also MILGRIM § 9.01;
Developments in the Law-Competitive Torts, 77 HARV. L. REv. 888, 948 (1964) [hereinafter
cited as Developments-Competitive Torts]; IndustrialEspionage 913; IndustrialSpying Goes
Big Business, Bus. WEEK, Oct. 6, 1962, at 65.
II. This development originated in the "conscience, justice and equity of the common-law
judges. [The doctrines] . . . developed . . . to deal with business malpractices offensive to the
ethics of. . .society, [were] a persuasive example of the law's capacity for growth in response to
the ethical, as well as the economic needs of society." Dior v. Milton, 9 Misc. 2d 425, 155
N.Y.S.2d 443 (Sup. Ct.), affd mem., 2 App. Div. 2d 879, 156 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1956). See also I
H. NIMS, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS § I (4th ed. 1947) [hereinafter cited as
NiMS]; Peterson, supra note 8, at 347-48.
12. This is the essence of the law of trade secrets. See notes 70-76 infra and accompanying
text.
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The extent to which competitors will seek to use or develop

improper means of discovery is partially a function of competitive
pressure in the market. 3 At the time when trade secret law developed,

the competitive nature of most markets was not particularly intense,
simply as a consequence of their local nature, the lack of comparative
knowledge by purchasers, and the more or less homogenous nature of
competing products. As society became mobile and developed
instantaneous mass communication, however, purchasers were made

aware of the availability and relative merits of competing products,
causing the nature of most markets to undergo marked change."

Consumer knowledge, in turn, caused product differentiation and
innovation to become the critical elements of competition and placed
increasing pressure on businesses to develop competitive advantages'.
To meet these demands often required an aggressive program of
research and development to create the innovations required to

differentiate one's own products from those of his competitors. As a
consequence of the rapid acceleration of technological discovery,
however, such a research program could be an extraordinarily
difficult and costly undertaking."

Thus, as technical evolution progressed and the competitive
pressure in many product markets intensified, improper discovery of

the commercial secrets of competitors became an attractive
proposition. 7 Faced with such pressure, business decision-makers had
13. See generally I CALLMANN

§

I.

14. It could be argued specifically that as an industry departs from the purely competitive
model, the actions and strategies of competitors take on an increasingly important function in
decision-making and risk reduction. See 54 IOWA L. REV., supra note 6, at 1164. For an
example of the transition from the "old" to the "new" environment, see IndustrialSecrets 32526.
15. Research secrets became the sine qua non of industrial power, and the company that did
not have secrets to protect really was not competing. Bender 913.
16. These increasing expenditures for research and development also encouraged industrial
espionage. See 45 NEB. L. REV., supra note 9, at 645.
17. Bartenstein, supra note 10, at 820. The pressure of an economic system where
momenteous change is incipient is well illustrated by the following passage:
Neither ["talent for exasperation nor nostalgia"] can erase a company president's night
thoughts ....
. . . when a competitor persuades the American Dental Association to love another
toothpaste, or a company he thought was in the film coating business in upstate New
York comes out with a dry-process office copier that makes his whole inventory . . .
nothing more than a tax writeoff; or a rival drug company takes the hottest thing to come
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to ponder the fact that a competitor's advantage could be reduced or
eliminated without the usually corresponding burden of staggering
18
development costs if his technological secrets could be obtained.
Even if he were to consider only the acquisition of operational
intelligence, as opposed to technical research secrets, the decisionmaker could look forward to the satisfying prospect of knowing his
competitor's strategy at nominal cost. 9
Availability of ElectronicSurveillance

At the same time that greater pressure was exerted upon
competitors to engage in improper discovery, the ability to gather the
commercial secrets of others increased. One of the unanticipated by-

products of World War II was a substantial advancement in both the
equipment and techniques of electronic surveillance. These

developments, originally intended for military espionage and
counterespionage use, 2 enabled business competitors to penetrate the
privacy of offices and monitor the basic channels of communication 2'

without the necessity of physical presence or the cooperation of

disloyal confidants. 22 The equipment used to carry out this
surveillance was not only lawful to possess but readily available to the
general public at reasonable prices. 23 Moreover, scores of men

E.

out of his laboratories, adds a molecule, and walks away with a good part of the market.
ENGBERG, THE SPY IN THE CORPORATE STRUCTURE 129 (1967) [hereinafter cited as

ENGBERG].

18. The competitor had to ask himself why he should expend the funds and energy necessary
to successful research when it is apparent that another company has satisfactorily resolved his
very problem. MILGRIM § 5.04[4]; Bartenstein, supra note 10, at 820.
19. A competitor's actions or strategies often constitute a significant variable in the process
of business decision-making. 54 IOWA L. REV., supra note 6, at 1164. See also ENGBERG 263;
Smith, supra note 1,at 118-20.
20. A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 67 (1967) [hereinafter referred to as WESTIN];
Hearings on S. 928 67, 441.
21. WESTIN 365.

22. The availability of electronic devices enables the unfair competitor to obtain secrets not
accessible to him before their development. IndustrialEspionage912.
23. E. LONG, THE INTRUDERS 64-78 (1966); WESTIN 365. These devices are often
extraordinarily simple to use, and anyone with enough skill, patience, and spare time to
assemble a jigsaw puzzle may install an effective eavesdropping system. ENGBERG 55-56. For
further discussion of the methods and technology of eavesdropping, see Hearingson S. 928, pt.
I, 73-86; S. DASH, R. SCHWARTZ, & R. KNOWLTON, THE EAVESDROPPERS 303-81 (1959);
Runft, The Electronic Eavesdropping Threat to the Right of Privacy: Can the States Help?. 3
IDAHO L. REV. 13, 14-31 (1966); Westin, Science, Privacy & Freedom:Issues and Proposalsfor
the 1970's, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1003, 1004-10 (1966).

It is increasingly common, however, to find that the mere possession of eavesdropping
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thoroughly trained by the military in the use of this sophisticated

equipment were then reentering the private enterprise system.2 4
Therefore, the increased pressure to discover the commercial secrets

of competitors coincided with the similarly increased procurement
capability.
The conflation of need to know and ability to get, of course, soon

led to utilization, and within a very few years, what had been the
problem of wrongful competitor conduct became the pervading
specter of industrial espionage.2 Instead of the problem of coping

with interpersonal or other readily apparent wrongs, the owner of
commercial secrets now faced the surreptitious incursion of the

techniques and gadgets of technological development, 26 which had
previously been generally associated only with international "cloakand-dagger" operations.
COMMON LAW RESPONSE TO THE ENCROACHMENTS OF
TECHNOLOGICAL SURVEILLANCE

The application of advanced surveillance technology was, of
course, not limited to extracting business secrets -individuals as well
as businesses became the targets of surreptitious surveillance. In the
past, as a means of remedying the wrongs consequent upon the uses of
devices is a crime. See, e.g.; GA. CODE ANN. § 26-3003 (Supp. 1970); MICd. Comp. LAWS ANN.
§ 750.539(0 (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626A.03 (Supp. 1970); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 570-A:3 (Supp. 1970); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.10 (McKinney 1967); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§ 11-35-24 (Supp. 1969). This development has been consistent with the opinion of
Congressman Gallagher that there is a "need for a great deal of new legislation regarding many
aspects of invasion of privacy. There may be a pressing need for some sort of control over the
manufacture, distribution, and sale of electronic devices and other gadgets used for
... Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. of Government
snooping.
Operations,89th Cong., Ist Sess., at 7 (Special Inquiry on Invasion of Privacy).
24. ENGBERG 191-96; IndustrialSecrets 327.
25. Industrial espionage is generally deemed a function of three contemporary business
facts: the high cost of research and development, a decrease in the usefulness of patents, and a
shortage of qualified technicians. Levitan, Trade Secret Piracy, 14 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 157,
158-59 (1965); see Smith, supra note 1, at 120; IndustrialEspionage912. It is also described as a
concomitant of a devotion to science. IndustrialSecrets 326.
26. The motives and targets of business espionage perpetration may be many and varied,
based either upon competitive or political considerations. Hearingson S. 928 55 1.
27. The encroachment of technology upon the individual may be illustrated by the use of the
camera which raised the initial proposal for a right of privacy. Warren & Brandeis, The Right of
Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193, 195 (1890) [hereinafter cited as Warren & Brandeis]. Other
examples may be the tapping of private telephone lines, Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225, 37
S.W.2d 46 (Ct. App. 1931), and the use of electronic transmission devices by a landlord to
overhear a tenant's conversations, Roach v. Harper, 143 W. Va. 869, 105 S.E.2d 564 (1956),
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the older commercial predatory techniques, the law had developed
theories based upon contract, trust, and confidence, which were
utilized to protect both the interests of the individual 28 and the
business entity.2 9 These doctrines provided expeditious remedies as
long as the cause of action involved a contract upon which a term
could be implied or a relationship upon which a trust or confidence
could be engrafted.30 As technology evolved, however, the opportunity
to perpetrate wrongs in circumstances outside contractual or
fiduciary relationships abounded, vitiating the protective force of the
traditional theories. 3 ' Thus, to adequately protect the victims of
technological encroachment required the creation of a remedy of
32
much broader foundation.
Protectionfor the Individual
The principal means of providing a place of sanctuary to the
individual from the prying eyes and ears of an inquisitive society was
through the evolution of the law of privacy, accelerated by an article
in the HarvardLaw Review by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, 34
which was written in specific fulmination against the photographic
'35
surveillance of Warren's family carried on by the "yellow press.
The article's analysis is predicated upon the inadequacy of traditional
doctrine to handle the new "technological wrongs" and a consequent
search for protection therefrom. Warren and Brandeis noted that the
law had evolved over time in response to new threats as they
confronted the individual. Initially he was accorded physical
protection against restraint and injury. Then the law of nuisance
evolved to protect his human sensibilities, and the doctrines of libel
28. Warren & Brandeis 207-12.
29. 2 CALLMANN § 51; RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, comment a (1939); Klein 440;
Stedman 22-24; Warren & Brandeis 212.
30. Warren & Brandeis 210. See also 2 CALLMANN § 51; RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757,
comment a at 4 (1939).
31. Warren & Brandeis 210-11; see Nizer, The Right of Privacy: A Half Century's
Developments, 39MICH. L. REv.526, 559 (1941).
32. Warren & Brandeis 211.
33. Id. at 197.
34. Id.,at 193. The actual origination of the right of privacy should probably be attributed
to Judge Cooley who had earlier noted that there was a "right to be let alone." T. CootY,
TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888). The development of this right of privacy has been criticized. Kalven,
Privacy and Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 326

.(1966).
35. Prosser, Privacy,48

CALIF.

L. REv. 383-84 (1960).
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and slander arose to protect his external reputation.:" Rather than
finding a right of privacy in the maxims of equity or in natural law
theory, Warren and Brandeis preferred the legally more concrete
approach of analogy. Principal support for their right of privacy was

found in the common law doctrines of intellectual and artistic
property.3 7 These doctrines were determined not to be based upon
principles of contract or trust but instead to be instances and
applications of a general right of privacy.3 8 Since the right of privacy
had already been recognized, Warren and Brandeis concluded that the

law could protect the individual from advancing technology without
formulating a new legal principle 39-a

position soon adopted by the

courts."
In anticipation of a discussion of the privacy principle in a
commercial context, it is significant to note that in the process of
reaching their conclusion that the law already afforded privacy
protection, Warren and Brandeis observed that the law of trade
secrets 4 1 was another aspect of intellectual property whose basis was
identified as an incident of a larger right of privacy." As evidence that
trade secret law was a manifestation of privacy protection, they
observed that courts would not fail to accord protection against the
unlawful discovery of trade secret knowledge by eavesdropping 43 or
wrongfully obtained access, which protection was explainable on
36. Warren & Brandeis 193-94. This development of the law was said to be inevitable and an
example of the capacity for growth which characterized the eternal youth of the common law.
Id. at 195.
37. Intellectual property is the law relating to "the protection afforded thoughts, sentiments,
and emotions, expressed through the medium of writing or of the arts, so far as it consists in
preventing publication.
... Id. at 205.
38. Id. at 213.
39. Id. at 206, 213. See WESTIN 344-46.
40. Proceeding from the first case adopting the right of privacy, Pavesich v. New England
Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905), the privacy law soon spread to the other states. See
F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 9.6 (1956) [hereinafter cited as HARPER & JAMIES];
W. PROSSER, TORTS § 112 (3rd ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]; WESTIN 346- 47. An
exhaustive bibliography is contained in I CALLMANN § 3.3, at 54 n.83.
A classic discussion of privacy protection vis-a-vis eavesdropping is contained in the dissent
of Mr. Justice Brandeis in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,474 (1928).
41. The law of trade secrets is discussed in some detail at notes 70-76 infra and
accompanying text.
42. Warren & Brandeis 212.
43. Eavesdropping was, at any rate, a crime itself at common law. 4 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES* 169. By the growing trend of statutory provision, eavesdropping is regaining its
criminal stature. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 26-3001 (Supp. 1970); MIH. Comp. LAWS ANN.
§ 750.539(d) (1968). See note 150 infra and accompanying text.
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neither contract nor confidence theories.44 Warren and Brandeis also
foresaw that profit-making consequent to the commercial
exploitation of intellectual rights was a further area which was
afforded relief under the privacy doctrine,4" as such protection, also,
was unexplainable on other grounds.
Non-Protectionfor the Corporation
The application of contract, trust, and confidence doctrines, which
had been used to protect individuals in earlier times, also became the
principal means of relief to commercial enterprises whose secrets had
been unlawfully appropriated by competitors.46 Just as these doctrines
proved inadequate to protect the individual from technological
47
surveillance they were also unsatisfactory in the commercial setting.
Given this similarity in both the previously applied doctrines of
protection and the technological changes which made those doctrines
obsolete, as well as the fact that the Warren and Brandeis article
initially dealt with trade secrets and profit-making, it might well have
been thought that the law of privacy would be naturally applied in the
protection of commercial trade secrets from surreptitious thievery.
Such a conceptual development, however, would have required the
courts to extend the right of privacy to a corporation,4" a step which
the courts have been unflinchingly reluctant to take. 49 The essential
44. Warren & Brandeis 212.
45. Id. at 204.
46. 2 CALLMANN § 61; Klein 440; Stedman 22-24.
47. See notes 77-106 infra and accompanying text.
48. It takes little perception to conclude that it is corporations for whom the protection of
commercial secrets is crucial. In light of other situations in which corporations are extended
forms of privacy protection, this fact alone should not, however, have posed a major hurdle. See
notes 142-66 infra and accompanying text.
49. See, e.g., Oasis Nite Club, Inc. v. Diebold, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 173, 175-76 (ID. Md.
1966); Vassar College v. Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co., 197 F. 982 (W.D. Mo. 1912); Maysville
Transit Co. v. Ort, 296 Ky. 524, 177 S.W.2d 369 (1944). See also I HARPER & JAMES § 9.06; S.
HOFSTADER & G. HOROWITZ, THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY § 5.1 (1964) [hereinafter cited as
HOFSTADTER & HOROWITZ]; PROSSER § 102; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652J,
comment c (rent. Draft 13, 1967); Annot., 30 A.L.R.3d 203, 212-13 (1970); Annot., 14
A.L.R.2d 750 (1950). But see E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th
Cir. 1970); Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, 327 Pa. 433, 194 A. 631 (1937) (Maxey, J.,
concurring).
Although the courts have generally failed to accord explicit privacy protection to
corporations, state legislatures have expanded such protection in response to the industrial
espionage threat. See Findings of Georgia Invasion of Privacy Study Committee (which
accompanied the submission of GA. CODE ANN. § 26-3001 et seq. (Supp. 1970)), reprinted in
Hearings on S. 928 610-11. See also notes 150-57 infra and accompanying text. The right of
privacy in commercial contexts is discussed in I CALLMANN § 3.3.

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1971:391

reason for this failure to apply privacy principles to the corporate
entity is probably to be found in the traditional reluctance of common
law judges to depart from established rules and principles. Just as in
earlier centuries plaintiffs were denied relief if they had no writ or
pursued the wrong cause of action, their contemporary counterparts
are often denied relief if there is no direct precedent for their
position." This rigid stare decisis approach, however, ignores the
traditional common law principle extending existing rules to new
5
situations as they arise. '
Where the corporate privacy question has appeared, however, the
courts have not been presented with the problem of industrial
espionage, but rather with three other general situations:
governmental regulation, use of corporate names, and voluntary
disclosure in confidence.
Corporations have often pleaded that government regulation
impinges upon their right of privacy. In the leading case of United
States v. Morton Salt Co.,5 2 Morton Salt had been directed to submit
reports of continuing compliance with Federal Trade Commission
orders. This directive was challenged on fourth and fifth amendment
grounds. In rejecting these defenses the Court utilized sweeping
language to preclude absolutely a corporate privacy right,
commenting that since corporations are allowed to operate in
interstate commerce by government grace they cannot object to being
required to comply with government regulations.53 The language of
the Court simply followed the principle that government favors often
carry an obligation to submit to regulation.54 Since Morton Salt,
limited to its facts, held only that a corporation has no right of
privacy vis-a-vis governmental regulatory inquiries,55 it is not
50. Lack of precedent was a reason for the rejection of the right of privacy itself in one of the
most celebrated cases arising after the Warren and Brandeis article. Roberson v. Rochester
Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902). See Kacedan, The Right of Privacy, 12
BOSTON U.L. REv. 353, 354 (1932); Comment, Thoughts Concerning the Status of the Right of
Privacyin Texas, 23 BAYLOR L. REv. 117, 130 (1971).
51. Nizer, supra note 3 1, at 557.
52. 338 U.S. 632 (1950).
53. Id. at 652.
54. Id. The corporation is, however, given protection from unlawful demands made in the
name of public investigation. Id. See See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); FTC v.

American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298 (1924) (a governmental fishing expedition is far contrary
to the principles of justice); United States y. Stanack Sales Co., 387 F.2d 849 (3rd Cir. 1968).

55. In Morton Salt the Court cited United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944), for the
proposition that a corporation is not entitled to claim a right of privacy. White, however, dealt
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necessarily authority for the denial of a corporate right of privacy in
other contexts. Nevertheless, Morton Salt has been erroneously cited

for the broad proposition that corporations are not entitled to a right
of privacy.

6

Commercial use of one corporation's name by another has also
raised the corporate privacy issue. The earliest case involving this
problem, and the earliest decision refuting a corporate privacy right,
was Vassar College v. Loose- Wiles Biscuit Co. 5 7 where Vassar
claimed a privacy right to prevent the use of its name and seal by a

candy manufacturer. The court, however, rejected Vassar's claim,
concluding that the right of privacy protected only injuries to feelings

8
and sensibilities, deprivations that a corporation could not claim.1

Although Vassar College was subsequently followed in many

jurisdictions,59 corporations have recently been included in statutes

providing a privacy remedy for the commercial use of name and
likeness,6" indicating that Vassar College may no longer be entirely

credible in those jurisdictions. Notwithstanding these statutes,
however, an additional remedy is available in "name use" cases, 6
with the availability of the privilege against self-incrimination to a labor union official in the
face of a government order to produce books and records. The Court commented in dicta that
"[s]ince the privilege. . . is a purely personal one, it cannot be utilized by. . .a corporation."
Id. at 699. Both Morton Salt and White use overly broad language and should not be interpreted
to bar a privacy cause of action as a remedy for industrial espionage.
56. See, e.g., Fleck Bros. Co. v. Sullivan, 385 F.2d 223, 225 n.7 (7th Cir. 1967); Oasis Nite
Club, Inc. v. Diebold, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 173, 175 (D. Md. 1966); Association for the
Preservation of Freedom of Choice, Inc. v. Emergency Civil Liberties Comm., 37 Misc. 2d 599,
600, 236 N.Y.S.2d 216, 218 (Sup. Ct. 1962); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652J,
comment c,at 147 (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1967).
57. 197 F. 982 (W.D. Mo. 1912).
58. Id. at 985. Accord, Jaccard v. R.H. Macy & Co., 176 Misc. 88,26 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1941),
affd 265 App. Div. 15, 37 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1942); Rosenwasser v. Ogoglia, 172 App. Div. 107,
158 N.Y.S.2d 56 (1916).
59. See, e.g., University of Notre Dame Du Lac v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 15
N.Y.2d 940, 259 N.Y.S.2d 832, 207 N.E.2d 508 (1965) (Notre Dame and its president were
denied an injunction against use of the school's name, symbol, and football reputation in the
film "John Goldfarb, Please Come Home," despite claims that the right of privacy of the
university was violated); Shubert v. Columbia Pictures, 189 Misc. 734, 72 N.Y.S.2d 851 (Sup.
Ct. 1947); Horowitz, The Right of a CorporateEntity to Protectionof Its "Privacy" or Rather
of Its Right of Property In Name, Likeness, 16 VA. L. WEEKLY DICTA Comp. 104 (1965);
Annot., 30 A.L.R.3d 203 (1970) (invasion of privacy-name or likeness). The cases following
Vassar College have been termed "unnecessarily restricted views." Nizer, supra note 31, at 550.
60. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-4-9 (Supp. 1968). But see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08

(Supp. 1970);

OKLA. STAT. ANN.

ch. 21, § 839 (1958).

61. See, e.g., Cornell Univ. v. Messing Bakeries, 285 App. Div. 490, 138 N.Y.S.2d 280,
affd, 309 N.Y. 722, 128 N.E.2d 421 (1955). See also I NiMS § 83; PROSSER § 112, at 843-44;
Horowitz, supra note 59, at 104-05.
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suggesting that denial of a corporate privacy right in those cases

should be no basis for its denial in other contexts devoid of a viable
alternative remedy.

The final corporate privacy area already substantially
litigated-voluntary disclosure in confidence-presents situations

more closely analogous to industrial espionage.6" The first significant
confidence decision was Maysville Transit v. Ort6 3 where plaintiff
corporation sought recovery upon a right of privacy theory for the

publication of its income tax return. The claim was denied on the
ground that the right of privacy protects the feelings and sensibilities

of individuals, not their property, business, or other pecuniary
interests.6" Similarly, in Copley v. Northwestern Mutual Life

Insurance Co.65 plaintiff partnership had disclosed business statistics
to the agent of defendant insurance company, who subsequently
disclosed them to the plaintiff's competitors. Recovery was premised

upon a breach of confidential relationship and the partnership's right
of privacy. The court, however, denied the right of privacy using
language similar to that in Maysville Transit." Both Copley and

Maysville Transit, however, involved a wrong for which an existing
remedy was available. In Copley the right of privacy claim failed, yet
a cause of action had been stated for the improper disclosure of trade
secret information obtained in confidence; and in Maysville Transit

a cause of action had been stated for violation of a Kentucky statute
concerning the confidentiality of a tax return. 6 As with the improper
use of corporate names, therefore, the confidence situation is
inappropriate for inclusion within the corporate right of privacy since
it is afforded adequate remedy under existing doctrine.
In the above three contexts a corporate privacy right has been
62. The confidential relation doctrine is probably the most frequently invoked trade secret
remedy. The doctrine states that one has a right to maintain the secrecy of his secrets, that
disclosure in confidence does not breach the secrecy, and that breaches of the confidence arc
actionable. See notes 79-85 infra and accompanying text.
63. 296 Ky. 524, 177 S.W.2d 369 (1944).
64. Id. at 526, 177 S.W.2d at 370.
65. 295 F. Supp. 93 (S.D.W. Va. 1968).
66. Id. at 95. In dispensing with the privacy claims both the Maysville Transit and Copley
courts used identical language to conclude that the right was never designed to protect "business
or other pecuniary interests." Such statements are simply inaccurate since Warren and Brandeis
specifically alluded to the fact that the right could protect future profits which were threatened
by the wrongful discovery of secret information. See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
67. 295 F. Supp. at 96.
68. 296 Ky. at 526-27, 177 S.W.2d at 371.
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clearly denied. With regard to government regulation, the denial is
probably proper-so long as business is protected against
governmental overreach. Likewise, use of corporate name and breach
of confidence situations do not demand such a remedy, but for a
different reason, since existing remedies are available to redress such
grievances, the courts, exercising traditional judicial restraint, simply
choose to utilize them. While the corporate right of privacy has thus
been rejected where its application was not necessary, such action
should not be precedent to deny its existence in an area where it is
needed -industrial espionage.69
A

RIGHT OF PRIVACY FOR THE CORPORATE VICTIM OF INDUSTRIAL
ESPIONAGE

The Need for Privacy Protection
The need for a corporate right of privacy as a remedy for the
victims of industrial espionage becomes apparent when existing

remedies are considered in relation to the espionage phenomenon. The
basic principle underlying the common law doctrines affording

protection to commercial secrets is the law of trade secrets. A trade
secret is most generally defined as any compilation of information

which is used in the business of its owner and which provides a
competitive advantage over anyone without its benefit. 70 The bases of
trade secret protection have been variously stated, 7 but the "essence"

of the law is that the trade secret will be protected against unfair and

improper conduct. 72 One is not prevented from lawfully

discovering-whether by copying or reverse engineering-the trade
69. It could be argued that a corporate right of privacy was recognized in Friedman v.
Restaurant Employees, 20 Ohio Op. 473 (C.P.), rev'd on other grounds 86 Ohio App. 189, 90
N.E.2d 447 (1941). Plaintiff sought to enjoin the picketing of his restaurant; the court observed
that "[w]hile it is true that this right of privacy . . . is one to be asserted by the individual, yet
when such right is interferred with for the deliberate purpose of affecting the business of a third
person . . . then such act becomes a tortious one and should be protected." Id. at 477. A
corporate right of privacy was recognized in E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431
F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970), discussed at length at notes 96-104, 158-66 infra, and in Waring v.
WDAS Broadcasting Station, 327 Pa. 433,442, 194 A. 631, 635 (1937) (Maxey, J., concurring).
70. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, comment b (1939). "It may be a formula for a chemical
compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or preserving materials, a pattern for a machine
or other device, or a list of customers." Id.
71. 2 CALLMANN § 51; MILGRIM § 1.01; Stedman 17-24.
72. 2 CALLMANN § 51. Trade secret law is essentially concerned with the circumstances in
which the trade secret owner will receive protection against the commercial use of the secret by
others. Developments-Competitive Torts 948.
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secrets of his competitors, 73 but one is prohibited from discovering
another's secrets by theft, bribery, stealth, breach of confidence, or

other improper or unlawful means. 74 This protection enables the trade
secret owner to deprive the public of the benefits of his discovery by
concealing and commercially exploiting the secret to his own

advantage. 75 The right is extinguished, however, and its protected
status lost, when the public learns of the discovery by fair and lawful

means. Once the secret is in the "public domain," either by
publication or lawful discovery, it is available for general use and
application.

76

Since it is the improper means of discovery against which the law
is directed, and not the trade secret rights themselves,77 common law

doctrines of unfair competition judicially evolved as a function of the
means employed. Broadly, these doctrines provide that where a

contractual or confidential relationship exists between the owner and
improper discoverer, the owner may predicate recovery upon either
contract or breach of confidence grounds. Where such relationship is
7
not present, the owner may pursue a misappropriation action. 1
Inasmuch as the most common source of trade secret litigation is
73. 2 CALLMANN § 53.3(a); I NIMS § 148.
74. The discovery rules have been described as follows: "One may use his competitors
process if he discovers the process by reverse engineering applied to the finished product. . . [or]
by his own independent research; but one may not avoid these labors by taking the process from
the discoverer without his permission at a time when he is taking reasonable precautions to
maintain its secrecy." E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1015 (5th
Cir. 1970).
75. Developments-Competitive Torts 948.
76. The fundamental basis for legal protection, as the trade secret name suggests, is that the
data in question be retained in secrecy. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, comment b (1939);
Stedman 6. See also 2 CALLMANN § 53.3; MILGRIM §§ 2.05, 2.06; i NIMS § 142. For
discussion of particular aspects of the trade secret law, see 2 CALLMANN §§ 51-59; R. ELLIS,
TRADE SECRETS (1953) [hereinafter cited as ELLIS]; MILGRIM; I NIMS ch. 1i; A. TURNER, TtIa
LAW OF TRADE SECRETS (1962). A concise survey may be found in Klein 437-44; Developments-Competitive Torts 948-50.
77. It is only in an exceptional case that trade secret rights are themselves the basis of an
action. Rather, in the normal situation, attention is directed toward the improper means by
which the trade secret was discovered-by unfairness, breach of confidence, or other tortious
interference. 2 CALLMANN § 53.2(b).
78. Id. § 51. Misappropriation is a branch of the unfair competition doctrine which is
generally said to have been initiated by Justice Pitney in International News Serv. v. Associated
Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). The theory of misappropriation deals with the copying, as opposed
to the taking, of otherwise protected intangible property which is, of necessity, in the public
domain. The doctrine is discussed in detail in Developments-Competitive Torts 93247.
Obviously, the theory of misappropriation would afford little protection to the industrial
espionage victim, whose stolen intangibles had been held in secrecy.
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the employee who departs with his former employer's trade secrets, 79
the breach of confidence doctrine is probably the most frequently
invoked remedy.8" The basic premise of that doctrine is that the owner
of a commercial secret has the right to maintain the secrecy against
strangers to the confidence."' To recover, the deprived owner must
prove the existence of a trade secret disclosed to his employee under an
obligation of secrecy and confidence 82 and that such obligation was
79. Doerfer, The Limits on Trade Secret Law Imposed by Federal Patent and Antitrust
Supremacy, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1432, 1435 (1967); Klein 453; IndustrialSecrets 328; Note, 54
IOWA L. REv., supra note 6, at 1166. Ironically, employee loyalty is believed to be one of the
best defenses against this sort of industrial espionage. Furasch, IndustrialEspionage, HARV.
Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1959, at 6, 164.
This is discussed as "run of the mill" litigation. Klein 462. The common fact situation will
involve an employee possessing information crucial to his employer's competitive advantage.
The employee will leave, join a competitor, and the competitive advantage will subsequently be
manifested in the competitor's product. See, e.g., Carter Prods., Inc. v. Colgage-Palmolive Co.,
130 F. Supp. 557 (D. Md. 1955), affd 230 F.2d 855 (4th Cir. 1956) (here the employee sought
out the competitor with instant shaving creme secrets which the competitor had been unable to
develop, and which had given the former employer a monopolistic position); Schulenberg v.
Signatrol, Inc., 33 111.
2d 379, 212 N.E.2d 865 (1965) (subsequent competitor's activity based
upon former employer's drawings); National Rejectors, Inc. v. Trieman, 409 S.W.2d I (Mo.
1966) (employees established competing slug-rejector manufacturing company); Minnesota
Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Technical Tape Corp., 23 Misc. 2d 671, 192 N.Y.S.2d 102 (Sup. Ct.
1959); B.F. Goodrich & Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 117 Ohio App. 493, 192 N.E.2d 99 (1963) (an
employee departed with particular knowledge of space suit design which had made the former
employer the undisputed market leader). The departing employee in the computer software
industry is discussed in Bender 913.
Although a departing employee is not strictly speaking a surreptitious device, employees may
be used as devices of industrial espionage. A competitor might place his own employees in his
competitor's plant and thus obtain competitive secrets. This, in fact, was the means by which
German steel czar Alfred Krupp obtained the secrets of the British forgemasters. See generally
Klein 462. The use of such undercover agents is effective, difficult to detect, and may continue
for an indefinite period. Smith, supra note 1, at 121. Relief is, however, available. In Eastern
Extracting Co. v. Greater New York Extracting Co., 126 App. Div. 928, 110 N.Y.S. 738 (Sup.
Ct. 1908), a spy was placed in a competitor's plant and the court allowed the competitor relief,
noting that "a man cannot, through deceit and by means of an appeal for employment as a
laborer . . ., enter the household of his benefactor and steal his belongings." Id. at 931, 110

N.Y.S. at 741.
80. Industrial Secrets 329. The confidence doctrine may also appear where disclosure is
made to a prospective purchaser, licensee, lender, or to an agent, partner or joint venturer. See 2
CALLMAN

§ 51.2;

MILGRIM

§§ 5.01-.05;

RESTATEMENT OF TORTS

§ 757, comment j at 13

(1939); Doerfer, supra note 79, at 1435-39.
81. Board of Trade v. Christie Grain and Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236 (1905); Peabody v.
Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452 (1868); ELLIS § 1.

82. The confidential relation may be either express or implied. Heyman v. A.R. Winarick,
Inc., 325 F.2d 584, 586-87 (2d Cir. 1963); 2 CALLMANN § 51.2(d). If there is no contractual
commitment, the disclosure must be specific or in concrete form. Bimba Mfg. Co. v. Starz, 119
Il. App. 2d 185, 256 N.E.2d 357 (1969). But in National Rejectors, Inc. v. Trieman, 409 S.W:2d
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subsequently breached to his probable detriment.1 Although the
confidence doctrine has proven to be a viable remedy,84 the typical
industrial espionage situation involves no confidential relationship.
Thus, in cataloguing the scope of protection offered by existing
remedies, it has been observed that electronic surveillance will cause
the trade secret doctrine to decline as a protector of commercial
secrets because the trade secret pirate is no longer dependent upon the
cooperation of disloyal confidants."
I (Mo. 1966), the court indicated that such a relation could not be found from the mere fact of
the employment relation. Id. at 35. An interesting debate has developed as to the validity of
employee contractual promises of non-disclosure of his employer's trade secrets. The parameters
of the problem are outlined and developed in 2 CALLMANN § 51.2(c); MILGRIM §§ 2.01-.09.
83. Macbeth-Evans Glass Co. v. Schnelbach, 234 Pa. 76, 87, 86 A. 688, 691 (1913). The
wrongdoing is the breach of the confidence, not a misappropriation of property. Servo Corp. of
America v. General Elec. Co., 393 F.2d 551, 555 (4th Cir. 1968). In E.I. duPont deNemours
Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917), Justice Holmes said that "[t]he property
may be denied but the confidence cannot be."
84. Although the remedy was effective in the past, it could be argued that it has been sapped
of much of its strength. The departing employee situation typifies this trend of judicial decision
in the confidence area. The crux of the issue there is that the interests of the former employer and
the departing employee are necessarily at odds once the employment relationship is severed, The
employer naturally desires to inhibit the dissemination of his trade secrets, while the employee
desires to be unhampered in the use of his acquired skills, knowledge, and experience and to be
free from employment mobility restraint. Wexler v. Greenberg, 399 Pa. 569, 578-79, 160 A.2d
430, 434-35 (1960); 2 CALLMANN § 54.2. To protect both interests, the courts must weigh not
only the relative business interests of the employer and the employee, but also possible
deleterious effects upon both innovation and the freedom of movement of employees. Id.
§ 54.2(a); 54 IOWA L. REV., supra note 6, at 1185. These competing demands have been
resolved by the judicial adoption of a theory allowing the departing employee to draw upon his
general skill and knowledge in subsequent employment as long as he does not impinge upon
specific trade secrets of his former employer. I Nims § 149; A. TURNER, TRADE SECRETS
§§ 161-63 (1962). This oversimplified principle is, of course, much easier to state than to apply.
Recent decisions reveal that courts are giving controlling weight to employee mobility by
setting increasingly strict requirements for employer recovery. See Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. Audio
Devices, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 250 (S.D. Cal. 1958), affd mem., 283 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 365 U.S. 860 (1961); Wexler v. Greenberg, supra; Industrial Secrets 336;
Developments-Competitive Torts 950-53. To establish the threshold requirement of a trade
secret, an employer may be required to meet a standard of proof and discovery which exceeds
that in any other trade secret context and which has been described as essentially synonymous to
a patent standard. Kalinowski, Key Employees and Trade Secrets, 47 VA. L. ReV. 583, 590
(1961); IndustrialSecrets 340. But see Water Servs., Inc. v. Tesco Chems., Inc., 410 F.2d 163,
172-73 (5th Cir. 1969); MILGRIM § 2.08[3].
This restricted interpretation of the confidence remedy as applied to the departing
employee could be seen as a bellweather leading to similar consequences in other areas of
commercial secret protection. In fact, this would appear to be the direction being taken by the
Supreme Court. See the discussion of Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1968); Sears, Roebuck
& Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376
U.S. 234 (1964), at notes 167-202 infra and accompanying text.
85. Industrial Espionage 918-19. This article contains a catalogue of the various remedies
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Without reliance upon trade secret doctrines, one might seek to
invoke other traditional legal remedies for the surreptitious taking of
commercial secrets. An action might be brought upon either a
trespass or theft theory. But the trespass action would require the
showing of an entry,8 6 not often present when electronic devices are
used, and consequently would probably not succeed against the
industrial espionage pirate. 87 The theft theory is more plausible, but
has been equally unsuccessful. To obtain relief under stolen property
statutes one must generally have been deprived of tangible property
and that label excludes intangibles such as trade secrets and other
commercial information. 8 Therefore, the stolen property acts offer
little solace to the industrial espionage victim. 9
As one- means of combatting this lack of protection, it might be
argued that since the emergence of industrial eslionage is yet another
manifestation of the traditional problem of unfair competition, the
doctrines which developed there against should apply notwithstanding
the distinctions noted. But this is simply not the case. The doctrines
related to unfair competition are concerned with activity the results of
which are cognizable wrongs-for example, a breach of confidence,
misrepresentation, misappropriation, or actual theft. Industrial
espionage, on the other hand, results from .activity whose
consequences may not only be uncognizable, but may also be
difficult, if not impossible, to prove in a court of law.9 0 Industrial
which might be applied in the industrial espionage context. Id. at 915-25. See also I CALLMANN
§§ 4-8. The doctrine of misappropriation would also be of little value in the context of industrial
espionage. See note 78 supra.
86. 1 HARPER &JAMES § 1.5; PROSSER § 13.
87. Industrial Espionage 919 n.46.
88. See Hawkland, Some Recent American Developments in the Protection of Know-How,
20 BUFFALO L. REv. 119, 123-24 (1970); Industrial Espionage 915-18. For example, the
National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1964), punishes the asportation of "goods," a
term which has been traditionally considered to include only tangible property capable of being
physically carried in interstate commerce. Although the definition of "goods" was expanded in
United States v. Lester, 282 F.2d 750 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 937 (1961), and
United States v. Seagraves, 265 F.2d 876 (3d Cir. 1959), to include the informational content of
maps, and in United States v. Bottone, 365 F.2d 389 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 974 (1966),
to include copies of documents, the Act is still considered inapplicable to intangibles.
Several states have adopted statutes which do cover the'theft of trade secrets. See note 106
infra. Amendments have also been offered unsuccessfully to the National Stolen Property Act.
See Hawkland, supra, at 123-24.
89. Hawkland, supra note 88, at 123 n.17; Industrial Espionage 915-18. In United States v.
Bottone, 365 F.2d 389, 393 (2d Cir. 1966), the court indicated that the National Stolen Property
Act would not apply to electronic espionage.
90. The problem of proof is probably the most difficult obstacle facing the industrial
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espionage is not, therefore, simply another form of unfair
competition.
In view of the uncertain applicability of these existing doctrines to
the practice of commercial surveillance, industrial espionage would
appear to be a "good gamble."'" The potential industrial espionage
pirate knows that electronic surveillance is likely to allow him to steal
secrets with the victim either not realizing the loss, being unable to
prove the necessary elements of recovery, or fearing complete
publication of his secret.9 2 Even were he to believe that his particular
acts would create the opportunity to apply an existing remedy, the
potential pirate could be confident that the resulting injunction9" or
damage award94 would be unlikely to leave him any worse off than he
was before he undertook his piracy.9 5
espionage victim, since secret information may be acquired through the use of eavesdropping
equipment preventing him from realizing the loss. To prove that the information was used to the
detriment of the victim is also difficult, since what is stolen is often little more than competitive
strategy. If the stolen item is a research secret, it is likely that it has not yet been manifested in
salable form, making damage calculation difficult. See generally Industrial Espionage 925.
91. Developments-Competitive Torts 954.
92. Id.
93. The older rule was that trade secret violations would be subjected to permanent
injunction. Shellmar Prods. Co. v. Allen-Qualley Co., 87 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1936), cert. denied,
301 U.S. 695 (1937), refusing to modify, 36 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1929); A.O. Smith Corp. v.
Petroleum Iron Works Co., 74 F.2d 934 (6th Cir. 1935), modifying 73 F.2d 53 (6th Cir. 1934).
Such a result, of course, puts the owner in a better position than he would have been without the
discovery. Developments-Competitive Torts 958-59. Following Conmar Prods. Corp. v.
Universal Slide Fastener Co., 172 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1949), however, the general trend today is to
allow only a temporary injunction. Winston Research'Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co.,
350 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1965); Schreyer v. Casco Prods. Corp., 190 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1951), cert.
denied. 342 U.S. 913 (1952). The use of temporary injunctions is in accordance with the rules
which the Supreme Court has promulgated in its "right to copy" cases, which are discussed in
detail at notes 167-74 infra. See Hampton v. Blair Mfg. Co., 374 F.2d 969 (8th Cir. 1967).
94. If the victim can prove no lost profits, he can recover only nominal damages, and if the
pirate is financially insecure, he is essentially judgment proof. In short, the threat of an
accounting for profits is likely to have little deterrent effect on the potential pirate. Industrial
Espionage 927-28. Furthermore, a damage recovery is unlikely to recompense the loss of a truly
valuable secret. See Harding, Trade Secrets and the Mobile Employee, 22 Bus. LAW. 395, 400
(1967).
95. Developments-Competitive Torts 954. This view may be illustrated by Schulenberg v.
Signatrol, Inc., 33 I11 2d 379, 212 N.E.2d 805 (1965), where unfair competition was found when
a former employee covertly took blueprints and employed them to establish a competing
business. The remedy accorded was an injunction limited to the period of time reasonably
required for an ex-employee to produce copies legally. Similarly, in National Rejectors, Inc. v.
Trieman, 409 S.W.2d I (Mo. 1966), although the court found that former employees had
utilized their prior employer's drawings improperly, it disallowed injunctive relief and limited
damage recovery to those profits lost during the period in which the competitor, but for
plaintiff's improperly used drawings, would not have been in production. The recoveries in both
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That such a belief by a potential pirate is well founded is made
apparent by the factual background of a presently pending lower
federal court case. This case is also to be seen as perhaps the most
compelling evidence of the need for a corporate right of privacy
because it exemplifies the current issue of whether existing remedies
afford recovery against the industrial espionage agent. In E.I. duPont
deNemours & Co. v. Christopher6 duPont had possessed a highly
secret, but as yet unpatented, competitively advantageous process for
the making of methanol. Although special secrecy precautions had
been taken during the lengthy and expensive development period, for a
brief time during the construction of the production plant, the new
process was visible from the super-adjacent airspace because of an
unfinished roof.9 7 During this period an airplane, piloted by the
independent contractor of a competitor, flew over the plant, and
photographs were taken of the visible process. The pictures were
conveyed to the competitor, who would be able to reduce them to
drawings of his own. Upon learning of the piracy, duPont
management brought suit alleging wrongful discovery of a trade
secret and asked for damages and temporary and permanent
injunctions. Arguing the inapplicability of the available forms of
relief, the defendant contended that its activity fit none of the existing
trade secret or unfair competition doctrines and was not, therefore,
unlawful. 8
To characterize the aerial photography in Christopher as being
within the stolen property doctrines would require an unrealistic
expansion of the most liberaladecisions construing the concept of what
is subject to theft. 9 There was also no breach of confidence,1 °° no
Schulenberg and NationalRejectors are insufficient to make the victimized employer whole and
are unlikely to deter those bent on unfair practices. See Klein 464-65; IndustrialSecrets 336;
notes 105-06 infra and accompanying text. The implicit reasoning behind this type of relief is the
same as that given for the change in direction of the departing employee cases-a preference for
information dissemination and employee mobility. See note 84 supra.
96. 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971), noted 2 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 247 (1970). It must be borne in mind when evaluating the Christopher case that it came
before the Fifth Circuit on interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) ( 1964) from the
district court's finding that duPont had stated a claim upon which relief could be granted.
97. The court did not indicate why the roof was unfinished at this critical stage of

construction.
98. 431 F.2d at 1014. See note 105 infra and accompanying text.
99. See notes 88-89 supra and accompanying text. As noted previously, United States v.
Bottone, 365 F.2d 389 (2d Cir. 1966), broadly indicated that the National Stolen Property Act
would not apply to industrial espionage activity.
100. A breach of confidence cannot exist where there is no relation of confidence upon which
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misappropriation,' 0 ' and probably none of the other wrongs
contemplated in the rubric of unfair competition.' 0 2 Although a
trespass action could be brought," 3 it would not likely compensate the
plaintiff for the acquisition of its secret. 14 Thus, the court could grant
relief.to the plaintiff, absent the availability of a 'corporate right of
privacy, only by considerable perversion of the scope fof existing
doctrines.
As a consequence of these several factors, those surveying the
usefulness of traditional trade secret remedies for the industrial
espionage victim have concluded that they are, for that purpose,
essentially useless.105 Recognizing the need for an adequate remedy,
these same observers have proposed a panopoly of new theories to aid
the industrial espionage victim.' 6
to erect a duty. Warren & Brandeis 212; IndustrialEspionage 919. See notes 84-85 supra and
accompanying text.
101. That doctrine relates generally to the provision of legal security for intangibles which
are of necessity open to public disclosure. See note 78 supra.
102. See generally Developments-Competitive Torts 947-59; IndustrialEspionage918-21.
103. Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 41 F.2d 929 (N.D. Ohio 1930); Smith v. New
England Aircraft Co., 270 Mass. 511, 170 N.E. 385 (1930); 1 HARPER & JAMES § 1.5.
104. The availability of a trespass action must be considered in light of the navigable
airspace claimed by the United States. 49 U.S.C. § 1301(24) (1964); United Statics v. Causby,
328 U.S. 256 (1946). Thus, flight in the airspace above 1,000 feet in congested, and 500 feet in
uncongested, areas is not subject to a trespass action by the owners of the ground below. 14
C.F.R. § 91.79 (1970). 1 HARPER & JAMES § 1.5. Even where a trespass action is available, the
recovery is likely to be nominal. See, e.g., Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., 270 Mass. 511,
532, 170 N.E. 385, 394 (1930).
105. This has been the predominant conclusion of those who have correlated existing
remedies with industrial espionage activity. The "current legal framework is now inadequate to
defend the American equilibrium on privacy from new surveillance techniques." WESTIN 369.
"Civil remedies in this country appear helpless in halting disloyal and unfair practices ....
"
Klein 462, 463-64. See Stedman 32; Developments-Competitive Torts 954; Industrial
Espionage927; IndustrialSecrets 326-30. But see Harding, supra note 94, at 400-01.
106. Four types of remedies'have been emphasized:
(1) Stiffer criminal penalties. MILGRIM § '5.05; Bartenstein, supra note 10, at 822; Klein 45965; Developments-Competitive Torts 955 (suggesting the possibility of treble damages in trade
secret cases, as is the case in patent law). Several states have enacted legislation making the theft
of trade secrets subject to criminal sanction. See GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1809 (Supp. 1970); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 14-1 et seq (Smith-Hurd 1964); IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3048 ct seq.
(Supp. 1970); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-548.01 et seq. (Supp. 1969); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 1195.1 et seq. (1969); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 155.00, 155.30 (McKinney 1967); WisC. STAT. ANN.
§ 943.205 (Supp. 1970). See also ABA SECTION OF PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT LAW
PROCEEDINGS 95-97 (1970); 45 NEB. L. REV., supra note 9, at 648-50.
(2) Proscription of surveillance per se. IndustrialEspionage929. See GA. CODE ANN. § 263001 (Supp. 1970); MIcH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.539(d) (1968). See note 150 infra and
accompanying text. See also S. 928, 90th Cong., ist Sess. (1967) (Right of Privacy Act of 1967).
(3) A limited grant of statutory protection comparable to the German Gebrauchsmuster
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The Denialof Privacy Protection
In light of the inapplicability of the traditional means utilized to
afford protection for commercial secrets, the need for a corporate
right of privacy as an industrial espionage remedy is clear. As has
been observed, however, the application of privacy principles to the
corporation has been a step that both courts 10 7 and commentators' 08
have been unwilling to take. As a foundation for the argument that
such a right should now be recognized, it is necessary first to survey
the reasons for this total denial and to determine their viability.
Privacy is a Personal Right Only. The first reason given for
refusal has been that the right of privacy is a right intended only to
protect the private sensibilities of natural persons, and not for the
protection of business or other pecuniary interests. 109 This assertion is
not only in conflict with the original thought of Warren and
Brandeis,"10 but has been rejected as a basis for not according other
privacy-related privileges to corporations. In the law of evidence, for
example, corporations are provided broad protection against
divulgence of both their trade secrets and their secret communications
during litigation.' Most pertinent, for present purposes, amongst the
evidentiary privileges is the attorney-client privilege.112 Although this
(requiring a given minimum level of novelty and originality), which would provide in essence an
extension of the patent laws. Stedman 32.
(4) A right of privacy. Horowitz, supra note 59, at 108 (suggesting that the courts will soon
add another chapter to the law by adopting a corporate and associational right of privacy). See
Industrial Espionage 925-34 for a summary of all the proposals thus far advanced.
107. Vassar College v. Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co., 197 F. 982 (W.D. Mo. 1912); Maysville
Transit Co. v. Ort, 296 Ky. 524, 177 S.W.2d 369 (1944). See note 49 supra and accompanying
text.
108. 1HARPER & JAMES § 9.6; HOFSTADTER & HOROWITZ § 5.1; PROSSER § 112.
109. Copley v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 295 F. Supp. 93 (S.D.W. Va. 1968);
Maysville Transit Co. v. Ort, 296 Ky. 524, 177 S.W.2d 369 (1944); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 652J (Tent. Draft 13, 1967).
110. See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
III. 2 CALLMANN § 53.3(c); ELLIS §§ 265-80; MILGRIM § 7.06; 1 NIMS § 147; 8 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2212 (MeNaughton ed. 1961); Note, Protection and Use of Trade
Secrets, 64 HARV. L. REV. 976, 983-84 (1951).
112. There is perhaps, no principle of law which rests on a sounder basis, or which is
supported by a more uniform chain of adjudication, than that which holds all
information acquired by an attorney from his client. . . as privileged communications.
Parish v. Gates, 29 Ala. 254, 259 (1856).
See Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 953 (1956);
Comment, The Lawyer-Client Privilege: Its Application to Corporations, The Role of Ethics,
and Its Possible Curtailment, 56 Nw. U.L. REV. 235 (1961); Note, Attorney-Client Privilegefor
Corporate Clients: The Control Group Test, 84 HARV. L. REV. 424 (1970).
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privilege had long been assumed to apply to corporate as well as
13
"natural" clients,

a federal district court decision in 1962'"

challenged that belief and precipitated a discussion by the Seventh
Circuit in Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Association. u15 The
district court had held that, since the attorney-client privilege was

historically created only for natural persons, it could not be invoked
by a corporation." 6 The Seventh Circuit reversed, concluding that the
privilege belongs to the client regardless of his corporate or noncorporate character." 7 Thus, by invoking the attorney-client privilege

a corporation seeking legal advice from an attorney may prevent
disclosure of confidential information relating to the advice sought." 8
This privilege, then, affords the corporation a range of protection

which has been described as an instance of a right of privacy. "'
Similarly, in response to the assertion that a defamation action
might be pursued only by a private individual, it has been argued that
a corporation should not be denied a cause of action for defamation

on the ground that it has no "personality" -that

is, feelings and

sensibilities-since the corporation, in effect, does have a personality

embodied in its business reputation protected by law. 2° Thus, the
corporation may seek to rectify aspersions cast upon its management
and credit.' 2 ' Additionally, corporations are included in statutes
113. See Annot., 98 A.L.R.2d 241,242 (1964).
114. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 207 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Ill. 1962), rev'd,
320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963).
115. 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963).
116. 207 F. Supp. at 773.
117. 320 F.2d at 322. This is consistent with the view that where corporations are placed in
identical circumstances with individuals, they will be given the same protection. Maysville
Transit v. Ort, 296 Ky. 524, 526, 177 S.W.2d 369, 371 (1943).
118. Even if the attorney-client privilege is for some reason not available, the corporation
may yet be protected under the "work-product" doctrine of Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495
(1947). The attorney's work-product protection is separate and distinct from the attorney-client
privilege. Natta v. Zletz, 418 F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1969); In re Nata, 410 F.2d 187 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 836 (1969).
119. WESTIN 335.
120. Pullman Standard Car Mfg. Co. v. Steelworkers, 152 F.2d 493, 496 (7th Cir. 1945); 1
HARPER &JANES

§ 5.3.

121. Where any of these factors are proven, a corporation has an action for libel without
allegation or proof of special damages. Maytag Co. v. Meadows Mfg. Co., 45 F.2d 299, 302 (7th
Cir. 1930); 10 W. FLETCHER, CYc. CORPORATIONS § 4887 (perm. ed. 1970); PROSSER § 106,
See also Note, Libel and the Corporate Plaintiff 69 COLIU,. L. REv. 1496 (1969). For a
discussion of libel and privacy as they relate to a corporation, see Fleck Bros. Co. v. Sullivan,
385 F.2d 223 (7th Cir. 1967).
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which afford relief for commercial appropriation of name or
23
symbol, 2 which Prosser defines as an area of privacy protection.
The denial of a corporate right of privacy on the ground that
privacy is a purely personal right seems, in view of the judicial

rejection of that rationale in other analogous contexts, tenuous at
best. 124
Adequacy of Existing Protection. The second reason for refusing

to accept a corporate right of privacy is the assertion that existing
doctrine already provides the corporation adequate protection against

unfair trade practices.1'2 This point requires no further amplification
in light of the preceding discussion'12 wherein it was observed that
existing doctrines are inapplicable to industrial espionage and provide

the victim inadequate protection.
Thus, both reasons typically offered for rejection of a corporate

right of privacy appear to be little more than inflexible responses to a
new use of an old remedy, and are thus not persuasive and ignore the

realities of the situation facing the industrial espionage victim.
The Advantages of a CorporateRight of Privacy
The essential question to be confronted in the advocacy of a
corporate right of privacy is: what presently unavailable benefit will it

confer upon either the owners of commercial secrets or upon society in
general?

To the owner of commercial secrets-the victim of industrial
espionage-the corporate right of privacy would provide several

identifiable benefits supporting his primary interest in the
maintenance of the secrecy of'his information. In light of the
inapplicability of the existing remedies for secret asportation,'2 one
122. See, e.g., UTAH CODE
123. PROSSER § 112.

ANN.

§ 79-4-9 (Supp. 1968).

124. It may be interjected, however, that this very foundation is the basis for upholding
denials to corporations of other privileges which are also aspects of a larger right of privacy. See
discussion of United States v. White at note 55 supra. In response, it is to be noted that the right
of privacy here advocated is not absolute, but like the attorney-client privilege and the protection
of the corporate reputation, is directed at only one facet of corporate existence-protection
against industrial espionage.
125. Harris, A Right of Privacy for Incorporated and Unincorporated Associations?. 16
VA. L. WEEKLY DICTA Comp. 97 (1965). This is one of the few articles concerning the
application of a right of privacy to a corporation. Harris determines that no such right is
necessary, a conclusion this writer believes inaccurate.
126. See notes 77-106 supra and accompanying text.
127. Id.
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advantage of the corporate privacy right would be that the industrial

espionage victim would have a means of rectifying the harm suffered
because of industrial surveillance.

Another potential benefit of the corporate privacy cause of action
is that it would simplify the present complications surrounding the
proof required to establish a violation of existing law. In order to

prove a violation of traditional trade secret law the victim must prove
both the elements of, and the damages consequent upon, a particular

wrong. 28 The acts for which these traditional remedies were designed,

however, involve wrongs whose commission and consequent damage

are not unduly difficult to establish. Industrial espionage, on the other
hand, often involves surreptitious acts whose effects are essentially
impossible to prove even if their commission is detected. 9 To avoid

these harsh burdens of proof, a corporate right of privacy would
require only that the victim prove the act of espionage. 3 ' The law of

privacy is an extension of the action of trespass, 3' rather than an
action on the case, and the tort law long ago crystallized the rule that

in a trespass action there is no necessity of proof of actual harm.' It
was the intentional invasion of plaintiff's right itself which was
regarded as the tort, not the damages actually inflicted. Thus,

invasion of the right of privacy entitles the plaintiff to compensatory
damages for the harm naturally suffered upon the invasion, with no

requirement of proof of special damages.' 33 Once the plaintiff
establishes the cause of action, he may also recover for any special

damages which he can prove to have been caused by the breach of
privacy.

34

Where the invasion of privacy could be shown to have been

128. MILGRIMI § 7.07[1]. See note 83 supra and accompanying text.
129. The "proof problem" is discussed in Industrial Espionage927.
130. Id. at 926.
131. HOFSTADER & HOROWITZ § 22.1.
132. PROSSER § 7.
133. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905); HOFSTADER &
HOROWITZ § 24.1; PROSSER § 112. The fact that damages may not be measured by a pecuniary
standard does not bar recovery. Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927). This rule
has been applied in situations dealing with eavesdropping and wiretapping. In Roach v. Harper,
143"W. Va. 869, 105 S. E.2d 564 (1956), the court held that a tenant had stated a cause of action
for invasion of privacy against her landlord who had placed a "bug" in her apartment, although
she alleged neither special damages nor publication. Accord, Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H,
107, 206 A.2d 239 (1964); Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225, 37 S.W.2d 46 (1931) (telephone tap);
Annot., 1 A.L.R.3d 1296 (1967). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 6521 (Tent. Draft
No. 13, 1967).
134. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 6521 (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1967) provides:
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knowing, the victim could also recover exemplary or punitive
35
damages.
A further advantage to the victim of industrial espionage would be
that the corporate privacy right would allow recovery for the theft of
any information, not simply that which could meet the definition of a
trade secret under the trade secret doctrine, since the privacy invasion
itself, not its results, would be punished. It was earlier observed that
industrial espionage involves the quest for both technical research
trade secret information as well as operational intelligence. 13 Thus,
the application of a corporate right of privacy to an industrial
espionage invasion would allow recovery for any breach of security,
regardless of whether it encompassed technical or non-technical data.
Liability would be placed upon one intentionally making the
unauthorized survey, independent of its consequence. The operative
element would be the act of surveillance, rather than the piracy of a
37
particular secret. 1
The social benefit derived from the recognition of a corporate
right of privacy for the victims of industrial espionage lies chiefly in
the facilitation and implementation of the public goals of promoting
competition and innovation and prohibiting wrongful market
conduct. It was with those purposes in mind that the courts of a prior
age afforded remedies to the victims of unfair trade practices. 3" But
those remedies have little applicability to industrial espionage. 139
Recognition of the corporate right of privacy would simply be a
means for society to implement its goals by providing a defensive
shield to the offensive thrusts of the commercial pirate. 4 0 Such
recognition would, moreover, allow the courts to meet the wrong
One who has established a cause of action for invasion of his privacy is entitled to recover
damages for
(a) The harm to his interest in privacy resulting from the invasion.
(c) Special damage of which the invasion is the legal cause.
See also PRossER § 112.
135. HOFSTADER & HOROWITZ § 24.4.
136. See notes 6, 19 supra and accompanying text.
137. IndustrialEspionage926.
138. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
139. See notes 77-106 supra and accompanying text.
140. The right of privacy has historically grown in response to the other developments of
society. As new means have been devised to offend the interests of privacy, the right of privacy
has been the defensive means by which the offensive challenge has been deflected. See Nizer,
supra note 31, at 559.
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head-on without perversion of existing doctrine to cover contingencies

for which it was not designed.
CORPORATE PRIVACY-ITS ADVOCACY AND ExISTENCE

In advocating that the corporate right of privacy should be
recognized as a means of protecting the victims of industrial
espionage, one might proceed upon either of two theories. It might be
argued, in light of the demonstrable inapplicability of existing forms
of action to industrial espionage activity, that there is a present need
for its creation. On the other hand, it could be contended, in view of
the many instances in which corporations are already granted forms
of privacy protection, that the corporate right of privacy already
exists and should simply be made available to the industrial espionage
victim. In terms of the historical development of the right of privacy it
is more accurate to argue that the corporate right of privacy already
exists-this approach found immediate judicial favor when utilized by
4
Warren and Brandeis. 1
One of the leading commentators in the trade secret field has
conceptualized a zone of corporate activity termed a "secret sphere"
around which the law has placed a protective veil.' This type of
analogy is a convenient means of expressing the view that the
corporation already enjoys the protection of an actual, if
unarticulated, right of privacy with regard to several areas of its
corporate existence. Beyond those "privacy areas" which have
already been discussed, 3 a corporate right of privacy is also indicated
by the availability of the judicial doctrines protecting commercial
secrets.' There has been much groping for a principle upon which to
141. See notes 33-45 supra and accompanying text.
142. 2 CALLMANN §§ 51.1, 56. "It constitutes ... an invasion of the secret sphere . . for
the competitor to attempt to ascertain the trade secret [improperly].
... Id. § 56,
143. Thus, it has been noted that the attorney-client and other evidentiary privileges allow
the corporation a right to maintain its correspondence in secret, a privilege which has been
identified as an incident of a right of privacy. See notes 111-19 supra and accompanying text.
Similarly, corporations are accorded a right to prevent the commercial appropriation of their
name or reputation, a right which is also described as privacy protection. See notes 120-23 supra
and accompanying text. For the legislative conclusion that the corporation is extended this type
of privacy protection, see UTAH CODE ANN. § 764-9 (Supp. 1969), which provides in pertinent
part as follows:
Any living person . . . whose name, portrait or picture is used . . . for advertising
purposes. . . and, any person or corporation may maintain an action against a violator
It shall not be necessary that actual damages to the plaintiff be alleged or proved
144. These doctrines are discussed at notes 70-85 supra.
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ground this protection,'

but it would appear to stem in substantial

part from a premise of privacy protection.'

Where common law

trade secret remedies are applied, that which is accorded protection

cannot be the unpatented information itself, since that would violate

the spirit of the patent laws. 14 7 Rather, the corporation is allowed to
maintain its secrets free from the inquisitive eyes of its competitors on

the same basis that it is able to maintain its correspondence free from
fellow-litigants and its name and identity from the commercial use of
others-upon a premise that the corporation does in fact have a
"secret sphere" of privacy around which the law has placed a veil of
Thus, when commercial intelligence agents seize a
protection.'

corporation's secrets, the law punishes not the compromise of the
secret, but the violation of the privacy sphere by the use of improper

means. The limited nature of the legal sanction applied to intrusions
upon the "secret sphere"-punishing only wrongful conduct-is not,

however, inconsistent with the right of privacy concept. The individual
is given no absolute right to keep his feelings, thoughts, and emotions

secret. He is, rather, required to temper his interest in privacy with
those societal interests with which it conflicts. 4 This is similar to the
limited protection allowed by the trade secret remedy. In both
145. 2 CALLMANN § 51.1; Warren & Brandeis 212.
146. This has been the implicit view of several commentators. See, e.g., WESTIN 334;
Stedman 23. Warren and Brandeis also used the trade secret doctrine as an example of the
application of the right of privacy. Warren & Brandeis 212.
In Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, 327 Pa. 433, 194 A. 631 (1937), plaintiff
orchestra conductor, whom the court considered to represent the corporate form of the
orchestra, had made recordings and when these were played over defendant's radio station,
plaintiff sought an injunction. The concurring judge concluded that the ground of relief should
be the right of privacy, citing the Warren and Brandeis article. Id. at 458, 194 A. at 643 (Maxey,
J., concurring). Thus, Waring could be read, at least in its concurring opinion, as recognizing
the existence of a corporate right of privacy. See also E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v.
Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970).
147. The policy of the patent law precludes the protection of articles for which no patent has
been obtained. Sears, Roebuck &Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964). The preemption of
the federal patent laws is discussed in detail at notes 167-209 infra.
148. 2CALLMANN § 51.1.
149. This fact was recognized by Warren and Brandeis, who provided a list of limitations
upon the right of privacy. Warren & Brandeis 214-20. The Supreme Court has also reiterated the
proposition that the right of privacy is a limited right. In Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967),
the Court extensively discussed such limitations and noted that "constitutional protections for
speech and press preclude. . . [punishment for] false reports of matters of public interest in the
absence of proof that the defendant [who had been sued under the New York right of privacy
statute-N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1948)] published the report with
knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth." 385 U.S. at 387-88.
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instances one is initially accorded a broad right of protection, which is
then reduced in compliance with the dictates of a free society and a
free economy.

Perhaps the most salient evidence that corporate privacy is a
viable concept is found in two recent legal developments. The first is
the inclusion of corporations in the expanding wave of eavesdropping
statutes which are evolving to protect the public from the
encroachments of surreptitious surveillance. These statutes provide
broadly that it is unlawful to employ eavesdropping devices for the
purpose of overhearing conversations or clandestinely observing

business operations.
legislative

history 51 2

50
1

It is clear from the language'

and the

of the statutes that they were designed to protect

150. The Michigan statute covers "[a]ny person who installs in any private place, without
the consent of the person or persons entitled to privacy there, any device for observing,
photographing or eavesdropping upon the sounds or events of such place.
... Mil. Comp.
LAWS ANN. § 750.539(d) (1968). See also ALASKA STAT. § 11.60.290 (1970); ARIZONA REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-1051 et seq. (Supp. 1970); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN., PENAL CODnE
§ 189 et
seq. (Pamphlet Supp. 1971); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.01 et seq. (Supp. 1970); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 26-3001 et seq. (Supp. 1970); HAWAII REV. LAWS § 275-1 et seq. (1968); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
38, § 14-I et seq. (Smith-Hurd 1964); KANSAS STAT. ANN. § 21-4001 et seq. (Supp. 1969);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 99 et seq. (Supp. 1970); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626A.01 et seq.
(Supp. 1971); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-35-274 (1969); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 570-A:1
et seq. (Supp. 1970); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.00 et seq. (MeKinney 1967); R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 11-35-21 et seq. (Supp. 1970).
A similar act was introduced in the 90th Congress, entitled the Right of Privacy Act of 1967,
S. 928, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. (1967), which provided, interalia, that:
§ 2511. Eavesdropping.
(a) Any person who. . . willfully uses or attempts to use any electronic, mechanical
or other device for the purpose of eavesdropping. . . when(4) such use or attempted use (A) takes place on the premises of any business or other
commercial establishment . . . ; or (B) obtains or is for the purpose of obtaining
information relating to the operations of any business or other commercial
establishment ....
See Hearings on S. 928, pts. I & 2. The present federal law prohibiting eavesdropping is
contained in 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq (Supp. V, 1970).
It might be noted that one probably unanticipated side effect of these statutes may be to
prevent the possession, by a supposed industrial espionage victim, of electronic device detection
equipment. See MILGRIM § 5.05, at 75 (Supp. 1971).
151. That the statutes are designed to protect privacy rights is clear from their language.
Thus, one statute makes it a violation for "any person to commit ... acts . . . which invade
the privacy of another." GA. CODE ANN. § 26-3001(f) (Supp. 1970). Another notes that
"persons entitled to privacy" are protected. MICH. COMp, LAWS ANN. § 750.539(d) (1968). See
also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.01(2) (Supp. 1970); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.650 (1969). Several of
the statutes are specifically entitled as dealing with "privacy." See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-3001
et seq. (Supp. 1970); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626A.0I et seq. (Supp. 1971).
152. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 928, at 610-1 I, which contains the report of the Georgia
legislature.
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the privacy interests of those against whom the evils of eavesdropping
are directed, including the privacy of businesses subject to industrial
espionage."5 These statutes are uniformly criminal in nature, 5 4 but
the provision of civil remedies in several is indicative of the fact that
they were intended not only to punish the wrongdoer but to provide a
privacy remedy to the wronged party as well. 55 The inclusion of
corporations within the sweep of this statutory privacy coverage"' is
persuasive evidence of the current vitality of the corporate right of
privacy, especially as regards the consequences of industrial
espionage.175
153. In the Report of the Invasion of Privacy Study Committee of the Georgia legislature
the following findings were recited:
The use of these [surveillance] devices in the field of industrial espionage, stealing of trade
secrets ...and other private investigation purposes has been made well known.
It was determined by the Committee that the necessity of the protection of the privacy
and elimination of growing practices of snooping and spying requires a new
comprehensive statute . . .[to protect] the individual's privacy and end the serious
intrusion of personal and businessprivacy.
Id. (emphasis added).
154. Several of the statutes deem eavesdropping a felony. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1052
(Supp. 1970); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 191 (PENAL CODE Oct. 1971); MICH. Comp. LAWS
ANN. § 750.539(c) (1968). Others make it a misdemeanor. ALA.SKA REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 11.60.310 (1970); KANSAS STAT. ANN. § 21-4001 (Supp. 1969); MONT. REV.CODES ANN.
§ 94-35-274 (1969).
155. Where a civil remedy is allowed, it consists of relief by injunction or actual or punitive
damages. See 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (Supp. V, 1970); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.10 (Supp. 1970); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 14-6 (Smith-Hurd 1969); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.539(h) (1968);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626A.13 (Supp. 1970); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 570-A:I I(Supp. 1970).
See also Proposed FinalDraftfor StandardsRelatingto ElectronicSurveillance,ABA PROJECT
ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 2.2 (1971).
156. Georgia, for example, provides that the invasion of the privacy of "another" by
surveillance or eavesdropping is punishable. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-3001 (Supp. 1970).
"[A]nother" is defined as a "person," id. § 26-401(c), while "person" is defined as "an
Id. § 26-401(1). See also Hearingson S.
...
individual, a public or private corporation.
928, at 610-11.
157. It could, of course, be asked why a common law privacy right should be recognized
when there already exists statutory privacy protection against industrial espionage. The question
is to be answered by observing that, not only do most jurisdictions still lack such eavesdropping
statutes, but also that where they do exist many do not on their face apply to corporations. The
statutes are also uniformly criminal in nature, with only a small percentage providing a civil
remedy. Finally, the coverage of the statutes seems directed at only the eavesdropping and
wiretapping aspects of industrial espionage activity and does not provide a remedy against aerial
photographic surveillance as was involved in Christopher,discussed at notes 96-105 supra and
notes 158-66 infra. They also do not provide a remedy against the spy in the victim's employ. See
note 79 supra. Thus, despite the existence of these statutory remedies, there is still a need for the
judicial recognition of a common law corporate right of privacy.
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The second significant development is the recent decision of the
Fifth Circuit in E.L duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher.5 ' As
has already been noted, that case involved the acquisition of a secret

process by aerial photography, an action which has been seen to be
subject to none of the existing remedies for trade secret theft.',
Implicitly recognizing this lack of coverage, the court in Christopher

chose to recognize a corporate right of privacy rather than to pervert
traditional theory. The court declared that in light of the current
tendency of the law to enforce higher standards of commercial
morality in the business world, trade secret protection should not be

limited to traditional doctrinal bases of relief. 6 ° Accordingly, the
court concluded that the invasion of commercialprivacyis actionable

and that aerial photography of commercial secrets constituted a
61

forbidden invasion.'
The significant future issues raised by Christopher may be
essentially resolved by examining the question of what test is applied
to determine a violation of the "commercial privacy" of the

espionage victim. The test articulated by the Fifth Circuit might be
stated as follows: if espionage could not be prevented because the cost

of necessary protections would be unreasonable, or if the invasion is
such as to be unanticipated and to preclude self-protection, then the

acts of the competitor violate the owner's right of commercial
privacy.16 2 This test is likely to become the cornerstone of future
industrial espionage cases, a result which will place a far different

complexion upon the business surveillance practice.

3

158. 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970).
159. See notes 99-104supra and accompanying text.
160. 431 F.2d at 1015. This is consistent with the original view of the Restatement of Torts
below the generally accepted standards
that improper means of discovery "are means which fall
of commercial morality and reasonable conduct." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, comment p
(1939).
161. The words of the court in Christopher are persuasive as to why there must be a
corporate right of privacy:
[lI]ndustrial espionage of the sort here perpetrated has become a popular sport ....
However, our devotion to free wheeling competition must not force us to accepting the
law of the jungle as the standard of morality. . . .Our tolerance of the espionage game
must cease when the protections required to prevent another's spying cost so much that
the spirit of inventiveness is dampened. Commercial privacy must be protected from
espionage which could not have been reasonably anticipated or prevented. ...
We introduce here no new or radical ethic since our ethos has never given moral sanction
to piracy. 431 F.2d at 1016. (Emphasis added.)
162. Id. at 1016.
163. Specifically, the court said "thou shall not appropriate a trade secret through
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In light of Christopher,the privacy-protecting eavesdropping
statutes, and the other reflections of a corporate "privacy sphere"

created by law,'64 it is believed that the corporate right of privacy
already exists,'

ready for application to specific future industrial

espionage events.'66
PREEMPTION BY FEDERAL PATENT POLICY

Although substantial authority supports the contention that a
corporate right of privacy already exists to protect the victims of
industrial espionage, the spreading shadow of the federal patent law,
as enunciated in three recent Supreme Court decisions, may be argued
to have preempted any judicial protection of unpatented information.
To determine the force of this preemption and its effect upon the
present analysis, it is necessary to review those decisions and their
progeny in some detail.
The Decisions

In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co. 6 7 and Compco Corp. v.
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc."'6 the Supreme Court dealt with the Illinois
law of unfair competition. In Sears Stiffel had been granted patents
on a pole lamp. Thereafter, Sears made an identical copy of the lamp

and sold it at a lower price whereupon Stiffel brought an action for
patent infringement and unfair competition. Although the lower court
found the patents invalid, it held that Sears' copying violated the state
deviousness under circumstances in which countervailing defenses are not reasonably
available." Id. at 1017.
164. One might additionally argue that as a consequence of NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S.
449 (1958), there is a residual right of associational privacy. In- that casc the Supreme Court
stated that the inviolability of group association may in many circumstances be essential to
preservation of associational rights. Id. at 462. Although one might seek to extrapolate that
.decision into the present context, such a position is unnecessary in light of the other bases herein
discussed and is specifically not relied upon as a basis for the envisioned right of privacy as a
remedy for the victim of industrial espionage. See Harris, supra note 125.
165. It has been predicted by one prominent observer of the law of privacy that the courts
will soon accord right of privacy protection to corporations. "In brief and in conclusion, new
law to protect the 'private' feelings of corporations and institutions is developing, and I make
bold to suggest that the New York Court of Appeals may well . . . add 'a new chapter to the
law."' Horowitz, supra note 59, at 108.
166. Remarking upon the combined effect of Christopherand other developments in the law
of privacy, it has been noted that the industrial spy may be entering a period of greater risk as
the privacy law develops. MILGRIM § 5.05, at 75 (Supp. 1971).
167. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
168. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
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unfair competition laws. The Supreme Court reversed, holding the

Illinois unfair competition law incompatible with the federal patent
laws. Justice Black, for the Court, predicated the decision on the

"familiar doctrine" that when a state law touches upon federal
statutory patent law it must yield. 9 To substantiate his proposition
that absent a patent right an article could receive no judicial

protection, Justice Black noted that when a patent is issued a
statutory monopoly is allowed and when the patent expires so does the
1 In the present
monopoly, the rights therein passing to the public. 70

case, the Court declared that since greater protection should not be

given an unpatented article than one upon which a patent has expired,
Stiffel's unpatented lamp was in the "public domain" and subject to
a public right to copy.' The lower court's allowance of an unfair

competition award, therefore, conflicted with the objectives of the
federal patent laws, since it gave Stiffel the equivalent of an unlimited
72
monopoly on an unpatented article.

Compco involved a similar situation. Day-Brite had developed a

distinctive design for the cross-ribbing of fluorescent lighting fixtures.
Having failed to gain a patent of its own, Compco nevertheless
produced the same article, precipitating suit by Day-Brite for patent

infringement and unfair competition. The district court held the
patent invalid, but found Compco guilty of the unfair competition

charge since similarity of the items was likely to cause confusion.
Justice
federal
patent
Brite's

3

Black, in reversing, noted that such a holding was contrary to
patent policy allowing free copying of whatever the federal
or copyright laws left in the "public domain," such as Day74
unpatented fixtures.

169. "[T]he federal policy 'may not be set at naught, or its effects denied' by the state law."
376 U.S. at 229. The language of the Court is probably somewhat broad as respects the scope of
preemption when state and federal acts interfere. See I CALLMANN § I1.2(a).
170. 376 U.S. at 230.
171. Id. at 23 1. It is interesting to note that 25 years prior to Sears the Restatenent of Torts
noted that, absent a breach of contract, abuse of confidence, or improper means of discovery, a
trade secret could be freely copied. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, comment a at 4 (1939). See
also American Harley Corp. v. Irvin Indus., Inc., 27 N.Y.2d 168, 179, 263 N.E.2d 552, 557, 315
N.Y.S.2d 129, 136, (1970) (Breitel, J., concurring). The scope of the "public domain" is
discussed at note 193 infra.
172. 376 U.S. at 233. The Court said that "the patent system is one in which uniform
federal standards are carefully used to promote invention while at the same time preserving free
competition." Id. at 230-3 1.
173. The decision premised upon likelihood of confusion has reference to the "palming off"
doctrine, another of the constitutents of the unfair competition doctrine, which was discussed in
Sears. 376 U.S. at 227 n.2. See I CALLMANN § 4.1; Nims § 9a.
174. 376 U.S. 234, 237-38.
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Although the specter of preemption has caused much "conjecture
and reverberation"'' 15 in the area of trade secrets, its full scope has not
as yet been completely delineated. Taken literally, Sears and Compco

seem to say that the protection of an un-patented commercial secret
conflicts with and undermines the federal patent laws. A literal

application of that broad rule to the law of trade secrets arguably
preempts state-created trade secret p.rotection. 176 Such construction

has not, however, been adopted by lower courts.'

The preemption

has been confined in effect to the copying of articles in the public

domain and rejected as to items held in secrecy. 178 Preemption has also
not been extended to the punishment of misappropriation 7 1 or to the
breach of confidence action. 8 Perhaps most importantly for present
purposes, Sears and Compco have been held inapplicable to industrial
espi6nage 5l or other usages of improper means. 8 2 Sears and Compco
175. MILGRIM § 7.0812][c].
176. Whether Sears and Compco have preempted the common law body of trade secret
rules has been a fertile subject of inquiry. See 2 CALLMANN § 53.2(b); MILGRIM § 7.08[2];
Adelman, Trade Secrets and FederalPre-emption-Aftermath of Sears & Compco, 49 J. PAT.
OFF. Soc'v 713, 715 (1967); Doerfer, supra note 79, at 1461-62; Peterson, supra note 8, at 35863; Note, The Trade Secret Quagmire-A Proposed FederalSolution, 50 MINN. L. REv. 1049
(1966); Note, Doctrine of Licensee Estoppel Overruled; State Protection of Unpatented
Inventions Questioned-Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 45 N.Y.U.L. REV 386, 391 (1970); Note, The
Stiffel Doctrineand the Law of TradeSecrets, 62 Nw. U.L. REV. 596 (1968).
177.. Hampton v. Blair Mfg. Co., 374 F.2d 969 (8th Cir. 1967); Servo Corp. of America v.
General Elec. Co., 337 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 934 (1966); Schulenberg
v. Signatrol, Inc., 33 111. 2d 379, 212 N.E.2d 805 (1965); 2 CALLMANN § 53.2(b);
MILGRIM § 7.08[2]; Bender 919; Hawkland, Some Recent American Developments in the
Protection of Know How, 20 BUFFALO L. REV. 119, 134 (1970);Note, Trade Secret Law After

Sears and Compco, 53 VA. L. REv. 356 (1967); 45 N.Y.U.L. REV., supra note 176, at 393. The
Schulenberg case was distinguished in Bimba Mfg. Co. v. Starz Cylinder Co., 119 II1. App. 2d
25 1, 256 N.E.2d 357 (1969), where no trade secret was involved.
178. Water Servs., Inc. v. Tesco Chems., Inc., 410 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1969). The court noted
that Sears and Compco do not apply to trade secrets which are not on the open market. Id. at
171.
179. See 53 VA. L. REv., supra note 177, at 359-63. The misappropriation doctrine is

discussed at note 78 supra.
180. Water Servs., Inc. v. Tesco Chems., Inc., 410 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1969); Servo Corp. of
America v. General Elec. Co., 337 F.2d 716, 723-24 (4th Cir. 1964); Bender 919-21.
18 1. Schulenberg v. Signatrol, Inc., 33 Ill. 2d 379, 212 N.E.2d 865 (1965). The court noted
that "[i]t is readily apparent that the Sears and Compco cases do not cover a situation of

industrial espionage by employees who plan to organize a competing company and thereafter do
that very thing." Id. at 386, 212 N.E.2d at 869. This view of Sears and Compco is, moreover, in
harmony with the opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring in both Sears and Compco, who
noted that vindication of federal interests does not require the toleration of predatory business
practices. 376 U.S. at 239.
182. Bender, supra note 9, at 919.
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may thus be seen to have been restrictively construed, and, in response
to the clamor of the commentators, found inapplicable to preempt the

laws of trade secret protection.

Even given this narrow construction,

however, one must remember that the Supreme Court has served

notice that it will reject any decision which frustrates or conflicts with
the patent law whether it be based upon trade secret or other
protective doctrines.""
The Supreme Court, however, has not been content to let the Sears
and Compco preemption rule have a "decent interment." In Lear,
Inc. v. Adkins'1 an engineer had been hired to help solve gyroscope
problems and agreed to grant his employer a license on all of the

inventions he developed. After discovering a production method
which improved the gyros, the engineer filed for a patent and, prior to

patent approval, licensed the innovation to Lear. Before the patent
was finally issued, Lear terminated its payment of royalties, claiming
that the improvement had been fully anticipated by an existing patent.

When a patent was finally issued, the engineer brought suit. The
California Supreme Court held, with regard to the pre-patent

California license, that Lear was estopped by its licensee agreement
from questioning the patent. 86 Upon appeal, the principal issue was

the vitality of the venerable doctrine of patent licensee estoppel,'
which the Supreme Court repudiated in reversing the California
decision.'
183. 2 CALLMANN § 53.2(b); MILGRIM § 7.08[2]; 45 N.Y.U.L. REV., supra note 176, at
391-93.
184. 2 CALLMAN § 53.2(b). It is, however, often repeated that there is no conflict between
the patent and trade secret laws. Id. 45 N.Y.U.L. REv., supra note 176, at 395; 53 VA. L. REV.,
supra note 177, at 371.
185. 395 U.S. 653 (1968).
186. 67 Cal. 2d 882, 435 P.2d 321, 64 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1967).
187. Estoppel hasmost often arisen in two distinct but closely related situations. . . . In
an assignment of a patent the inventor ostensibly transfers . . .all rights under his
patent. . . .If after the assignment the inventor commences or continues to manufacture
the patented device,. . . the inventor may not defend on the basis that his invention was
invalidly patented. A patent license . . . is a transfer . . . of a limited right. . . .A
patent license is a contract, and a cause of action thereunder will normally arise . , . if
the licensee breaches . . . .In the past, courts have refused to permit a licensee to assert
the invalidity of the licensed patent when he is sued for non-payment of royalties. Note,
"Decent Burial" ofPatent Licensee Estoppel, 1970 DUKE L.J. 375-76.
See also Tiokol Chem. Corp. v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 313 F. Supp. 253, 255 (D. Del. 1970).
188. In reversing, the Court felt required to accommodate the competing demands of the
common law of contracts and the federal patent laws, which involved precluding breach of
promise on the one hand and facilitating the dissemination of information on the other. 395 U.S.
at 668. The holding of Lear would, however, apparently be overruled by a pending bill
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Although Lear is primarily important for its repudiation of the
estoppel rule,8 9 for present purposes the Court's discussion of the
licensing of unpatented inventions is particularly significant. The
Court found that Lear squarely raised the question of whether, in light
of the patent laws, the states may accord protection to the owners of
unpatented discoveries which are disclosed to others for the payment
of royalties.' This issue is particularly crucial to the law of trade
secrets because such contractual arrangements are the basic means by
which trade secrets are disseminated to non-owners and by which an
owner protects himself against disclosure by those to whom he
divulges secrets in confidence.' Licensing has not in the past been
viewed as bringing the trade secret into the public domain, 9 2 and the
question raised by the Court in Lear goes to the heart of that theory.
Specifically, the question raised by Lear is whether the patent
preemption enunciated in Sears and Compco prohibits the protection
.of secrets which are not the subject of patent rights and which are not
otherwise in the public domain.9 3 Although the Court chose to leave
introduced by Senator McClellan, S. 643, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), which is discussed at note
209 infra. See MILGRIM § 7.08[21 n.56.27.
189. See generally MILGRIM § 7.08[21; 1970 DuKE L.J., supranote 187; 45 N.Y.U.L. REv.,
supra note 176.
190. 395 U.S. at 674. The Court also phrased the question as whether "federal law requires
that all ideas in general circulation be dedicated to the common good unless they are protected
by a valid patent." Id. at 668. See MILGRIM § 7.08[2].
19 1. MILGRIM §§ 3.02, 3.05[3]; Bender 920; Klein 446. See the discussion in Water Servs.,
Inc. v. Tesco Chems., Inc., 410 F.2d 163, 170-71 (5th Cir. 1969).
192. 2 CALLMANN §§ 52.1, 53.3(d).
193. Inasmuch as the patent preemption doctrine enunciated in Searsapplied only to articles
in the "public domain," it could be argued, in light of the lower court construction placed upon
the scope of the preemption, notes 176-84 supra, that the "public domain" includes only those
articles not held in secrecy. Arguably, this view could be supported by the language of the Court
in Lear that the "federal law requires that all ideas in general circulation be dedicated to the
common good unless they are protected by a valid patent." 395 U.S. at 668 (citing Sears and
Comipco) (emphasis added). It could also be supported by the fact that the articles in both Sears
and Conipco were in "general circulation." In view of the broad language he used in Sears and
Cotnpco and in his Lear concurrence-dissent, Justice Black, however, implies that all inventions
are in the public domain as an initial matter-a view supported by Painton & Co. v. Bourns,
Inc., 309 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd and rem'd, - F.2d - (2d Cir. 1971). If this
view prevails, it will cut to the heart of the trade secret protection. Adelman &Jaress, Inventions
and the Law of Trade Secrets After Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 16 WAYNE L. REV. 77, 84 (l969). See
also 45 N.Y.U.L. REV., supra note 176 at 387-91.
To eliminate the spectre of Lear over the trade secret law congressional action has been taken
both to establish a federal law of trade secrets and to restrict the scope of patent policy
preemption. See notes 209 & 217 infra.
It should be noted that the issues here discussed were not the subject of either brief or oral
argument in the presentation of Lear before the Supreme Court. MILGRIM § 7.08[2].
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the question open,' 94 it did say that the issue, unsettled in a hundred
years of case law, 9 5 should now be adjudicated. 9
The ultimate effect of the unanswered question in Lear upon the

scope of the patent preemption policies is, at this point, a subject
which is open to considerable conjecture, and its ultimate resolution
has generated a great deal of controversy.'97 The potential effect of
Lear upon the patent preemption doctrine could follow either of two

polar courses. It might, first of all, be found to have reiterated the
literal meaning of the language of Sears and Compco so as to entirely

preempt the state trade secret doctrines, a result resoundingly rejected
by the original judicial construction of those cases. Alternatively,
Lear might be distinguished to the extent that its "non-holding"
would not alter the premption doctrine as previously interpreted.,"8 In
view of the facts of Lear, it is not unlikely that federal patent

preemption may now extend to the protection of secrets not heretofore
deemed to be in the public domain, particularly secrets disclosed in

confidence since a licensee arrangement has in the past been
considered a relation of confidence.

9

Such construction would, of

course, essentially preempt the traditional trade secret doctrine.
194. This question was considered, in a separate opinion by Justices Warren, Douglas, and
Black to have already been decided in the affirmative by Sears and Compco. 395 U.S. at 677,
Mr. Justice Black observed that
[n]o State has a right to authorize any kind of monopoly on what is claimed to be a new
invention, except when a patent has been obtained . . . . [P]rivate arrangements under
which self-styled "inventors" . . . disclose [their inventions], in return for contractual
payments run counter to the plan of our patent laws. . . . The national policy . . .
favoring free competition and narrowly limiting monopoly, cannot be frustrated by
private agreements among individuals, with or without the approval of the State. Id. at
677.
Whether Sears and Compco in fact answered the question is open to considerable dispute. See
Wetzel & Niro, The Look of Lear-An Advocate's View, 45 NOTRE DAME LAW. 475, 482
(1971). The question was again raised in subsequent litigation. Adkins v. United States Dist.
Ct., 431 F.2d 859, 860 (9th Cir. 1970). The failure of the Court to decide the question "seems
designed to continue . . . the controversy initiated ... " by Sears and Conpco. 45 N.Y.U.L.
REv., supra note 176, at 391.
195. MILGRIM § 7.08[2][c].
196. 395 U.S. at 674-75. The Court also observed that "it is impossible to predict the extent
to which this re-evaluation will revolutionize the law.
... Id. at 675 (emphasis added), One
writer has expressed the belief that in this part of the opinion the Court has indicated that the law
of trade secrets has a very questionable future vitality. Bender 921. See also MILGRIM § 7.08[2].
197. A compilation of citations is in MILGRIM § 7.08[2] nn. 56.19, 56.22; 45 N.Y.U.L.
Rav., supra note 176.
198. MILGRIM § 7.08[2], at 7-70.2.
199. See note 80 supra and accompanyihg text. One commentator, however, differentiating
among various confidence relationships, acknowledges that Lear may apply to licensing
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Upon the rendering of the Lear decision, a portent of doom was
forecast for the future vitality of the trade secret law, premised upon
the fear that Lear had reaffirmed the broadest of possible scopes for
the patent preemption.2 10 This prediction has, unfortunately, been
"more prophetic than would have been hoped. ' 2 1 The one case which
has reached the question of the breadth of the post-Lear preemption
doctrine has applied it to the trade secret area. In Painton & Co. v.
Bourns, Inc., 212 the issue was whether a trade secret licensee was
required to pay royalties under an expired licensing contract on
models for which no patent application had been or would be made.
The district court, relying on Lear, held that protection would violate
federal patent policy, and that under applicable state law the licensee
could continue its manufacture despite termination of the licensing
contract. Particularly noteworthy is the court's discussion of the
combined effect of Sears, Compco, and Lear upon the law of trade
secrets. The court noted that the strict requirements of the patent laws
would be weakened if an inventor could enforce protective contracts
for allegedly secret ideas without submitting them for patent
analysis. 213 Such allowance would cause the "severely restricted area"
left open by the Supreme Court to become a "yawning abyss. 12 4 For
arrangements but would not apply to the employer-employee situation. "An employee may be
found to be in closer privity with the owner of the secret than is the licensee. Also, the abolition
of trade secret protection in the employee-employer case would seem innately to deprive a person
of his 'right' to keep his secret-as opposed to licensing it for compensation." Bender 921. Mr.
Bender also proposes a means of applying Learto the law of trade secrets so as to minimize its
preemptive injury. Id. 921-26. It will be noted that Sears and Compco were construed as
inapplicable to relations of confidence. See note 179 supra. Thus, it could be concluded that the
operative effect of Lear will be to limit further the confidential relationships to which the
preemptive force of the patent laws will not apply.
200. MILGRIM § 7.08[2]. See also Wetzel & Niro, supra note 194, at 484.
201. MILGRIM § 7.0812],at7-70.6.
202. 309 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd and remanded,
F.2d (2d Cir. 197 1). The
district court opinion was criticized in Milgrim, Sears to Lear to Painton: Of Whales and Other
Matters, 46 N.Y.U.L. REV. 17 (1971); 84 HARV. L. REV. 477 (1970), and was appropriately
described as "the first offspring of the preemption dragon .
Bender 922.
203. 309 F. Supp. at 274.
This court's enforcement of such an agreement would be contrary to our national patent
law and policy . . . . Our patent policy of strict regulation of inventions would be
undercut if inventors could enforce agreements for compensation for alleged secret ideas
without being required to submit those ideas to the Patent Office, and, thereby,
eventually have the ideas disclosed to the public. Id.
Painton, it may be noted, actually decided only the narrowest question left open by
Lear-the licensing of non-patented articles. Whether or not this preemption would also restrict
remedies for conduct which would previously have been punished as wrongful discovery of a
non-patented article, however, is still an open and disputed question.
204. 309 F. Supp. at 274.
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these reasons, the court observed that the "federal patent law requires
an inventor to submit his ideas to the Patent Office before . . .[they
will be protected] ....
If cases consistent with Painton & Co. typify the "wake" of Lear

as to the future scope of the preemption doctrine, it is fairly clear that
the law of trade secrets will be reduced to a shambles. Such a result,

however, has been met with a resounding "hue and cry"-including

20
reversal by the Second Circuit of the district court in Painton & Co. 1

As courts thus consider the interests and policies underlying trade
secret protection, 2 1 it is likely that Lear will have only slight effect
upon the restrictive application already given the Sears and Compco
preemption.2 This result would be consistent with the contemporary
wisdom of trade secret commentary. Whatever the future application
of Lear, however, it is apparent that, subject to reinterpretation by the
Supreme Court, the combined impact of Sears, Compco, and Lear

makes the continued application of the unfair competition and trade
secret doctrines to the protection of non-patented commercial secrets
somewhat problematic." 9
205. Id. A similar result was reached in Bimba Mfg. Co. v. Starz Cylinder Co., 119 III. App.
2d 251, 256 N.E.2d 357 (1969), citing Lear, where an injunction and damage award predicated
solely upon the departing employee's copying of a non-trade secret article was held to be in
conflict with the federal patent laws. Id. at 271, 256 N.E.2d at 367.
206. Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc.,
F.2d
(2d Cir. 1971). See MILGRIM § 7.08[2],
at 7-70.7; Adelman & Jaress, supra note 193, at 93; Arnold & Goldstein, Life Under Lear, 48
TEXAS L. REv. 1235, 1260 (1970); Bender 923; Milgrim, supra note 202; 1970 DuKE L.J., supra
note 187, at 389-90; 45 N.Y.U.L. Rav., supra note 176, at 391-94.
207. For a discussion of some of these policies, see 45 N.Y.U.L. REv., supra note 176, at
393-96.
208. In reversing the district court in Painton, Judge Friendly discussed in some detail the
interrelation of Sears, Compco, and Lear, and the trade secret doctrines. Painton & Co. v.
Bourns, Inc.,
F.2d
,
(2d Cir. 1971). It has been noted that the construction of
Lear has not disturbed the prior construction of the,Sears and Compco preemption. Comment,
The Viability of Trade Secret ProtectionAfter Lear v. Adkins, 16 VILL. L. REV. 551, 568-69
(1971). Seealso Bendix Corp. v. Balax, Inc., 421 F.2d 809, 821 (7th Cir. 1970).
209. 2 CALLMAN § 53.2(b). Lear might, of course, be reversed by congressional action,
without waiting for the Supreme Court to reconsider the practical effects of an overly broad
preemptive patent policy. The practical consequences of Lear are discussed in 45 N.Y.U.L.
REv., supra note 176, at 392-96. Such a legislative reversal has apparently already been initiated. Senator McClellan has introduced a bill in the 92d Congress which appears to overrule any
possible extension by Lear of patent policy preemption into other areas, such as trade secrets,
thus giving congressional force to the original interpretation of the Sears and Compco
rule-that it does not apply to unpatented articles held in secrecy. S.643, 92d Cong., IstSess.
(1971), would provide, in pertinent part, as follows:
35 U.S.C. § 301Preservation of Other Rights. This title shall not be construed to pre-empt, or
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Effect Upon the Industrial Espionage Privacy Remedy
The combined effect of Sears, Compco, and Lear, of course, raises
serious questions regarding the advocacy of a corporate right of
privacy as an industrial espionage remedy. Especially is this apparent
in light of the Christopher court's position that a violation of the

commercial right of privacy was one form of improper discovery
under the traditional trade secret doctrine. 210 The critical inquiry is

whether the corporate right of privacy is a distinct cause of action or
simply another aspect of trade secret law subject to the vicissitudes of

patent policy preemption, and hence of little consolation to the
victims of industrial espionage.
Given the recent interpretation of the scope of federal patent
policy preemption 2 1 and the propensity of contemporary courts to
22
favor the free dissemination and use of non-patented information, it

is not entirely unforeseeable that the scope of preemption may
truncate the common law trade secret doctrine. The harshness of such

a result may, however, be prevented by several factors which could
make the actual scope of preemption largely a matter of academic
interest to the industrial espionage victim. The first is that Lear is
likely to be restrictively construed, as were Sears and Compco,2 3 to
otherwise affect in any way, contractual or other rights or obligations, not in the nature
of patent rights, imposed by State or Federal law on particular parties with regard to
inventions or discoveries whether or not subject to this title.
Significantly, section 301 is omitted from an essentially similar bill introduced by Congressman
Wilson, H. 4012, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). A bill similar to S. 643 was introduced in the 91st
Congress, S. 2756, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), and received the endorsement of the American
Bar Association. See ABA SECTION OF PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT LAW PROCEEDINGS 140 (1970). An amendment to S. 2756 offered by Senator Scott would have made
the congressional reversal of Lear apparent, and this amendment has also been offered in the 92d
Congress. S. Amend. No. 23, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), cited in 39 U.S.L.W. 2554 (Apr. 6,
1971). These proposals are discussed, and their effects analyzed, in Wetzel & Niro, supra note
194, at 485-86, where it is said that S. 2756 would delete from the patent laws what was never
there before Sears and Compco. Regarding the bleak outlook for non-patented commercial
secrets, it might, in any event, be recalled that the Supreme Court has previously taken positions
substantially contrary to prior law only to find that its initial foray was too sweeping and that
retreat was necessary. See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). That case declared a
broad union right to publicize labor disputes, a right which was thereafter significantly limited
in Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949) and in Teamsters Local 695 v.
Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957).
210. 431 F.2d at 1015-16.
211. See notes 167-209 supra and accompanying text.
212. See note 84 supra and accompanying text.
213. See note 183 supra and accompanying text.
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preserve the trade secret law largely unaffected.21 4 Even if cases such as

the district court opinion in Painton & Co. prevail, however, federal
patent preemption is nevertheless a matter of statutory, not
constitutional preemption, and Congress retains the power to
establish a federal trade secret policy independent of the patent laws
and their preemptive character. 215 Thus, before the trade secret law is

entirely scrapped by construction or before the Court realizes the
impact of its decision on industry, 2 1 Congress may exercise its own

initiative and establish a federal law of trade secrets not subject to
patent law preemption thus mooting the question of the scope of
217

preemption.

Regardless of the future course of patent policy preemption, the
right of privacy is not a matter of trade secret law, although it was so
21 8
denominated in Christopher,
but is rather derived from the law of

torts'and is not, therefore, subject to preemption by the patent laws. 2 9,

The corporate privacy right would, of course, punish the improper
means of discovering trade secrets, but to label it as merely another

form of trade secret relief is to misinterpret the right of privacy. A
right of commercial privacy accords to the corporation a zone of
secret existence not subject to the surveillance of its competitors.

When that zone is compromised by the competitor, it is the
intentional act of espionage which is punished, not the success or

failure of the expedition. Even if no secrets are obtained, relief is still
214. 45 N.Y.U.L. REV., supra note 176, at 393-95; 16 VILL. L. REV., supra note 208, at 56869.
215. Bender923;see 2 CALLMAN § 53.2(b).
216. It us been observed that the restrictive interpretation given Sears and Compco was a
consequence of a recognition of the practical consequences that a broad preemption doctrine
would cause in the market place, and in the application of the law of trade secrets. See 45
N.Y.U.L. REV., supra note 176, at 393.
217. Such a result has already been initiated. Senators McClellan and Scott have introduced
in the 92d Congress a bill which would give congressional sanction to a federal trade secret law.
S. 647, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971), would provide, in pertinent part, as follows:
§ 43(a). Any person who shall engage in any act, trade practice, or course of conduct, in
commerce, which(3) results or is likely to result in the wrongful disclosure or misappropriation of a
trade secret or confidential information ....
A similar bill was unsuccessfully introduced in the 91st Congress. S. 766, 91st Cong., Ist Sess.
(1969). See Bender 923.
218. 431 F.2d at 1016-17.
219. The inapplicability of the Sears, Compco, and Lear preemption doctrine to common
law causes of action is discussed by Judge Breitel, concurring, in American Harley Corp. v.
Irvin Indus., Inc., 27 N.Y.2d 168, 174-82, 263 N.E.2d 552, 555-59, 315 N.Y.S.2d 129, 133-40
(1970).
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available. 2 0 Since it is not the trade secrets as such which are
protected, but rather the corporate "privacy sphere," the preemptive
force of the patent laws should not effect the privacy protection.
Whatever the declared policy bases of the patent laws, they can have
only marginal applicability to the inviolateness of the corporate
personality as it relates to the industrial espionage activities of

competitors.
Although patent policy preemption casts a shadow over the scope

of protection to be accorded non-patented information, that shadow
is not itself grounds to deny the application of a corporate right of
privacy to the industrial espionage victim.
CONCLUSION

The need for a corporate right of privacy as a remedy for the
industrial espionage victim has been clearly espoused in both

legislative analysis 22' and judicial opinion.222 Supporting these
legislative and judicial findings are the conclusions of those analysts
who have seriously considered the present dilemma of the unprotected

industrial espionage victim. 22 But, notwithstanding this articulation
of recognized need, the leading privacy commentators have

mechanistically adhered to juristic consistency by rejecting the

corporate privacy cause of action, 224 although conceding that in some
respects the corporation receives the same privacy rights and remedies
as does the individual. 225 To reject a corporate privacy right while
220.
221.
222.
223.

See note 137 supra and accompanying text.
Hearingson S. 928, at 610-11.
E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970).
See note 105 supra and accompanying text.
224. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652J (Tent. Draft 13, 1967). The Restatement
cites the same cases discussed and distinguished at notes 52-69 supra. Id., comment c, at 147.
225. The Restatement provides as follows:
A corporation. . . has no personal right of privacy. . . .It has, however, a limited right
to the eclusive [sic] use of its own name or identity. . . and it receives protection from
the law of unfair competition. . . .To some limited extent this may afford it the same
rights and remedies as those to which a private individual is entitled [under the law of
privacy] .
I...
Id. at 146.
This language is similar to that in Fleck Bros. Co. v. Sullivan, 385 F.2d 223 (7th Cir. 1967),
where plaintiff corporation brought action alleging libel and an invasion of its right of privacy
for defendant credit information company's use of its name. The court did not pass on the
privacy claim, but commented that if the libel ground were upheld the privacy claim would also
be satisfied. Id. at 225.
The language of the Tentative Draft and Fleck Bros., thus, indicates the curious position of
refusing to allow a corporation directly the protection it may obtain indirectly. This perhaps
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conceding that corporate privacy interests may yet be protected is, at

the least, hypocritical. To invest corporations periodically with the
benefits of a privacy right, but to stubbornly reject absolute

recognition because of unrelenting adherence to unnecessarily broad
contrary precedent, ignores the traditional common law adaptation to

changing economic and social circumstances.2 6
Whenever courts are presented with a new right or remedy, or the
extension of an old one into a new area, the instinctive reaction is to

reject the assertion and refrain from unleashing a cascade of vexatious
litigation. The corporate right of privacy is, of course, open to such

objection, which predictably met the advocation of the personal
privacy right decades ago. 2 27 Such an argument should not, however,
indicates the strained position in which courts find themselves when they desire to adhere to a
firm line of precedent-that a corporation has no right of privacy-but are confronted with a
situation which demands relief. Such a strained position would likely indicate that the next step
will be the recognition of the corporate privacy right. This would certainly be one means of
reconciling Christopher,discussed at notes 96-104, 158-63 supra, and accompanying text, with
the previously firm line of authority holding that a corporation had no privacy rights.
226. "Political, social, and economic changes entail the recognition of new rights, and the
common law, in its eternal youth, grows to meet the demands of society." Warren & Brandeis
193. See also Nizer, supra note 3 1, at 526, 559.
227. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 535, 545, 64 N.E. 442, 443 (1902);
Lisle, The Right of Privacy (A Contra View), 19 Ky. L.J. 137, 142 (1931).
A legitimate question might be raised regarding the potential scope of the corporate privacy
remedy: against what will it be directed? While a complete response is difficult because the limits
of the remedy will depend largely upon the means employed by future industrial espionage
pirates, a test may be fashioned to provide some indication of the parameters of the doctrine.
One test that might be applied would provide that the corporate right of privacy remedy will
punish conduct which violates the privacy sphere of the corporation, and which is unanticipated,
undetectable, or unpreventable. See E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d
1012, 1016-17 (5th Cir. 1970).
With this test as a guide, it is appropriate to explore briefly some of the effects of the right of
privacy on current industrial espionage practices. With regard to most forms of electronic
surveillance, for example, the privacy remedy would, under this test be relevant, since the
detection and prevention of eavesdropping may be essentially impossible. A similar result might
be anticipated with regard to the intentional placing of spies in a competitor's plant. The
difficult cases, however, will involve situations where present remedies are inadequate, as, for
example, the predicament of an employer whose employee joins a competiting corporation
which subsequently begins production of what had theretofore been the employer's trade secret
product. It has already been noted that the judicial remedy in this area accords scant protection
to the former employer. See notes 83-90 & 110 supra and accompanying text. Will a privacy
remedy prevail? Under the Christophertest discussed above, it would probably not. This is a
type of competitor activity which can be anticipated, is reasonably detectable, and preventable.
See Harding, supra note 94, at 402-04. Moreover, there are significant policy decisions
implicitly made by courts which would delimit privacy relief even if the privacy remedy were to
apply. See note 84 supra and accompanying text.
Because any corporate right of privacy claim is likely to be accompanied by untold factual
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impede the adoption of the corporate privacy remedy. The courts have
had no difficulty ferreting legitimate from vacuous claims of
individual privacy invasion and should be similarly successful in the
corporate context. Objection might also be made on the ground that
once recognized the application of the corporate right of privacy
would uncontrollably expand beyond industrial espionage into other
areas where corporate privacy protection is either unnecessary or
undesirable. Over the years, however, aspects of corporate privacy
have been both granted and denied, evidencing the judicial ability to
segregate claims. This flexibility serves both to rebut objection to, and
indicate the present vitality of, the corporate privacy right even
beyond the industrial espionage context. Thus, the corporation is
allowed privacy recovery for the commercial use of its name or
reputation, 2 1 for the unconscionable tactics of the credit reporting
bureaus,221 and for the installation of electronic surveillance devices
upon its premises,230 but is denied an element of privacy when its claim
to the privilege against self-incrimination is rejected.33
The evolutionary process culminating in the present recognition of
a corporate right of privacy, although grudging, essentially typifies
the common law process. The need for privacy protection in the
industrial espionage context having been made apparent, a corporate
right of privacy has been recognized. Because this new corporate right
is derivative of tort and not trade secret law, it is immune from
possible federal patent policy preemption. The industrial espionage
victim now has only to prove the act of surveillance to premise his
recovery, with actual damages and coincident scienter constituting the
bases of special and punitive damage awards. Potential and present
industrial espionage pirates are now forewarned that the risks and
liabilities of espionage tactics have risen to the point that it may no
longer be such a "good gamble" to undertake a surveillance
2
campaign against one's competitors.
nuances, and because it is simply beyond the scope of this comment, an exhaustive discussion of
the future application of the doctrine is not attempted here. Once courts take notice of the
privacy remedy as an existing means of protecting corporations, they should have little difficulty
segregating appropriate right of privacy claims.
228. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-4-9 (Supp. 1968).
229. Fleck Bros. Co. v. Sullivan, 385 F.2d 223, 225 (7th Cir. 1967). The court noted that
privacy protection could be had, although the name of the relief might be different.
230. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970); Hearings
on S. 928 610-11. See also notes 150-57 supra.
231. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699 (1942). See note 55 supra.
232. See MILGRIM § 5.05, at 75 (Supp. 1971). Why industrial expionage has heretofore
been a "good gamble" is discussed at notes 91-104 supra and accompanying text.

